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Faculty and Deans

BLAME THIS MESSENGER: SUMMERS ON
FULLER
Paul A. LeBel*
LoN L. FULLER. By RobertS. Summers. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 1984. Pp. xiii, 174. $19.95.
Publication of the fourth volume in the Jurists: Profiles in Legal
Theory series, 1 and the first devoted to an American legal philosopher,
provides an occasion for consideration of more than just the merits or
deficiencies of this particular work. A comparison of Professor Summers' addition to the series with the earlier volumes lends itself to reflection on the opportunities .and responsibilities of the series'
contributors, and the comparison may also reveal something about the
nature of legal philosophy in this country. Ac9ordingly, the plan for
this review of Summers' tribute (p. vii) to Lon Fuller is first, to indicate the role that the Jurists series can play, second, to suggest some of
the ways in which the Summers book fails to fill that role, and third, to
offer a very general critique of the agenda that American legal philosophy has set for itself.
I

The historian of philosophy of law confronts at the outset a methodological choice between different principles upon which to structure
his presentation. A philosopher-centered approach will focus on those
figures who have made major contributions to jurisprudence, while an
idea-centered model develops the core jurisprudential concepts along
broad thematic lines. 2 Each of the options carries with it certain risks.
The former approach, often chronologically ordered, can all too easily
lapse into a tedious account of the "and then, after Aquinas died . . ."
variety. As the parade of philosophers passes before the reader, the
impact of the most significant thinkers can be blunted, and the perception of conceptual unity and clarity can be impeded. The idea-centered
• Associate Professor of Law, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William and
Mary. A.B. 1971, George Washington University; J.D. 1977, University of Florida. -Ed.
1. The previous volumes were A. KRONMAN, MAx WEBER (1983), N. MAcCoRMICK,
H.L.A. HART (1981), and W. MORISON, JOHN AUSTIN (1982).
2. Books of readings for law school jurisprudence courses are often susceptible to C?tegorization along these lines. For an example of a book that primarily takes the philosopher-centered
approach, see G. CHRISTIE, JURISPRUDENCE: TExT AND READINGS ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF
LAW (1973). F. CoHEN & M. CoHEN, READINGS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND LEGAL PHILOSoPHY (P. Sbuchman ed. 1979), is predominantly an idea-centered anthology, as is LoRD LLOYD
OF HAMPSTEAD, INTRODUCTION TO JURISPRUDENCE (4th ed. 1979).
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approach, on the other hand, can misleadingly convey jurisprudential
ideas as full-blown entities at the expense of an understanding or appreciation of incremental developments in the process of "doing" jurisprudence, i.e., of thinking about the nature of law. 3
In structuring each of the early volumes of the series around a
single figure, 4 Jurists offers a promising alternative to the superficial
surveys that are currently available. There are, however, a number of
questions that need to be addressed if the series is to achieve its full
potential as the most important contemporary secondary source on
jurisprudence readily accessible to the nonspecialist reader. In this
section of the review, I will identify some of the questions that appear
not to have been satisfactorily resolved to date, including: what is the
audience for the series, what is the mission of the individual volumes,
and how should the match between subject and author be made. While
I offer tentative suggestions about the lines along which answers could
be developed, more comprehensive responses must await the attention
of those scholars with a deeper and wider background in the field.
What is the audience of the series?

The choice of the subjects and authors for individual volumes and
the substance of the individual volumes necessarily depend on the underlying conception of the audience to which the series is addressed.
In suggesting that the volumes "are intended as reflective essays rather
than as comprehensive monographs," Professor Twining, the general
editor of the series, may be trying to reach the reader with some sophistication in the field while still offering the neophyte a "short, authoritative, reflective introduction[ ]." 5 However admirable the goal
of providing something for everyone, either the series as a whole or
particular volumes could fall into the gap between those two potential
readerships.
The series got off to an impressive start, and set a correspondingly
high standard for future volumes, with the MacCormick study of
H.L.A. Hart. 6 One may wonder how a study of the philosopher who
rescued legal positivism from the immature perspective of the imperative theorists such as John Austin and from the internal inconsistencies of Hans Kelsen could go astray, but I suspect that MacCormick's
3. The standard texts for student use attempt to incorporate both approaches, but run a
considerable risk of doing neither very well. See, e.g., E. BoDENHEIMER, JURISPRUDENCE: THE
PHILOSOPHY AND MErnoD OF TilE LAW (rev. ed. 1974); E. PATIERSON, JURISPRUDENCE:
MEN AND IDEAS OF mE LAW (1953).
4. Later volumes may not be structured in this way. In his General Preface to the series,
Professor Twining stated: ''The conception of the series is sufficiently broad to include studies of
groups of thinkers and even of single works." Twining, General Preface, in N. MAcCORMICK,
H.L.A. HART (1981).
5. Id.
6. See N. MAcCoRMICK, supra note 1.
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work has something in common with the play of the greatest athletes:
they make the difficult look easy, and thus may create the risk of being
under-appreciated. To a presentation of Hart's major themes that is
both lucid and faithful to the original, MacCormick has added a succinct and cogent appraisal as well as an extension of some of Hart's
major ideas. 7 The student beginning the study of jurisprudence could
use the MacCormick volume to test his or her own understanding of
Hart, while the reader with a more fully developed critical attitude
toward Hart can easily benefit from an exposure to MacCormick's
insights.
The next two volumes in the series played a somewhat different
role. MacCormick's reflections on Hart were a valuable complement
to the original work, but the ultimate force of the volume was
centrifugal, pushing the reader outward toward study of the works of
Hart. The Morison and Kronman volumes have more of a centripetal
force, and can be viewed more as substitutes for, rather than complements to, direct study of the original work of their subjects. The primary work of both Austin and Weber is, I suspect, too often either
read in abbreviated excerpts or ignored entirely in the basic jurisprudence course. 8 Lengthy exposure to Austin's major work9 is undoubtedly deterred by what Lon Fuller has described as "what may well be
the dreariest prose ever penned by man." 10 Weber is not sufficiently a
philosopher oflaw qua law, and his theory oflaw is either so scattered
across the range of his work or so buried in the "dense prose" of the
Sociology of Law, 11 that the reader without a broad base in philosophy
and sociology may be reluctant to venture onto what appears to be
treacherous ground. Although not wishing to be cast in the role of
encouraging reliance on secondary works as a substitute for careful
scrutiny of the original work of important scholars, I suspect that each
of these volumes, albeit in different ways, interjects into the basic
study of jurisprudence a more rigorous explication of these scholars'
contributions than their work might receive on its own.
1. In so doing, MacCormick has made accessible to a wider audience the significant scholarship contained in his earlier work, LEGAL REAsoNING AND LEGAL THEORY (1978).
8. Of the works cited at note 2 supra, the Cohen and Cohen book has a 20-page excerpt from
Austin, F. CoHEN & M. CoHEN, supra note 2, at 8-28, but nothing from Weber. Lloyd includes
17 pages from Austin, LoRD LLOYD OF HAMPSTEAD, supra note 2, at 19-21 & 223-37, and none
from Weber, although Weber is given a brief textual discussion. Id. at 350-51. In keeping with
his practice of providing the student with lengthy excerpts from the philosophers who are included in his book, Christie provides over 120 pages excerpted from Austin, G. CH!usTIE, supra
note 2, at 471-594, but nothing from Weber.
9. J. AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURlSPRUDENCE DETERMINED (H.L.A. Hart ed. 1954).
10. L. FuLLER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURlSPRUoENCE 103 (temp. ed. 1949).
11. See A. KRONMAN, supra note 1, at 1.
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.What is the goal of the individual volume?
These remarks on the earlier volumes in the Jurists series indicate
that the purpose of the individual volumes is dependent upon, and
should vary according to, the extent to which the original work of the
subject is (a) inaccessible and (b) likely to require such an interdisciplinary background as to present a forbidding facade to the uninitiated
reader. When the barriers appear to be formidable, the authors of Jurist volumes have an opportunity to carve out handholds that facilitate
surmounting the barriers, thus opening up intellectual terrain that
might otherwise go unexplored. By adding to the richness and variety
of the encounter with jurisprudential matters, series volumes that
widen the scope of the reader's exposure serve a valuable purpose. 12
Authors of series volumes about writers such as Fuller, whose
work is readily available to contemporary audiences and is written in a
manner that invites rather than deters comprehension (p. 15), are in
large measure relieved of the path-breaking tasks imposed on authors
who address the more obscure, if not obscurantist, works of legal philosophers. Although path-breaking may not be a necessary function
when· writing about the more accessible figures, indicating a route
through a body of worK. may still be an important contribution to a
wider and deeper understanding of the work, particularly when it covers a broad spectrum of topics.
Certain general responsibilities are inherent in writing for an audience composed in part of readers who may be using a volume in this
series to guide ~m initial exploration of the work of a legal philosopher.
Professor Twining has noted his request that contributors "set their
subjects in the context of their times and specific concerns," and "be
scrupulously fair in interpretation but not . . . inhibited in expressing
their own opinions." 13 Both backward- and forward-looking evaluation may be beyond the capability of the reader drawing initially on
his or her own resources. Identification of the intellectual currents out
of wliich the subject's work emerged, and from which it diverged, is a
service the author needs to provide, along with a demonstration of
how the work has affected, or is likely to affect, the future course of
developments.

What qualities should be sought in the authors?
The tasks described in the preceding section call for a variety of
skills. The sine qua non is, of course, a thorough mastery of the work
of the subject of the volume. Without a firm grasp of the full oeuvre of
12. The goal of expanding the range of tools with which the reader thinks about law and
legal problems suggests that as the series includes volumes that are not philosopher-centered, a
promising line to pursue would be some of the "law and .••" subjects, chief among them being
law and economics.
13. See Twining, supra note 4.
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the subject, 14 the author of even these short reflective introductions15
will be unable to appreciate how the diverse strands the work might
form a pattern that will make it easier to assess the significance of the
subject's thought.
Nearly as important as an understanding of the work of the subject
is a familiarity with the milieu in which the work took place. An author would be seriously handicapped in trying to explain Hart without
at least a basic appreciation of the linguistic and analytical philosophy
being done at Oxford, 16 or in attempting to assess Austin's significance
without locating his work within the utilitarian circle that influenced
and supported that work.17
This series demands more than just reporting or paraphrasing if it
is to achieve its full potential. The authors must·bring to bear on their
subjects an independent intelligence that Professor Twining describes
as "sympathetically critical." 18 Synthesizing· various themes, rerouting lines of argument around pitfalls, carrying an argument through
the next stages of development - these tasks require that the authors
be substantial scholars in their own right.

of

II

Measured against the level of performance of the first three
volumes in the series, or evaluated in terms of the questions raised in
the preceding section of this review, Professor Summers' contribution
is a seriously flawed work that will not enhance the reputation of the
Jurists series. Perhaps the most striking feature of the volume is the
choice of Summers as the author of a volume on Fuller. For at least
two major reasons, Summers would not appear to be an obvious candidate for the role. First, as Summers himself acknowledges at the outset of the book (p. vii), a sympathetic account of Fuller's work marks a
departure from his earlier treatment of Fuller. 19 Second, Summers'
14. Writing about living legal philosophers presents obvious difficulties that are not present
when the body of work is closed, but it may present opportunities as well. An active scholar may
become so focused on details that not only does the forest disappear, but the recognition of the
trees as well might be prevented because of an inability to see anything but individual leaves. An
objective evaluation of one's work to date has the potential of providing an illuminating perspective that the scholar might not otherwise receive from critiques that are as much directed at the
details as is the work being evaluated.
15. See note 5 supra and accompanying text.
16. SeeN. MAcCoRMICK, supra note 1, at 12-19.
17. See W. MORISON, supra note 1, at 38-60.
18. See Twining, supra note 4.
19. Compare Summers, Professor Fuller on Morality and Law, 18 J. LEGAL Eouc. 1 (1965),
reprinted in R. SUMMERS, MoRE EssAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY: GENERAL AssESSMENTS OF
LEGAL PHILOSOPHIES 101 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Summers, Morality], with Summers, Professor Fuller's Jurisprudence and America's Dominant Philosophy ofLaw, 92 HARv. L. REv. 433
(1978) [hereinafter cited as Summers, Dominant Philosophy].
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views of American legal philosophy20 are sufficiently idiosyncratic that
one might view with some suspicion his selection as a contributor to a
series such as Jurists. Neither one of these points necessarily disqualifies Summers from contributing a volume on Fuller to the Jurists series. Nor do I mean to suggest that there is not a good deal that is of
value in this book. However, a consideration of these two points
reveals, and perhaps explains, a number of the major flaws in Lon L.
Fuller.
As noted before,2 1 Professor Twining has asked contributors "to be
sympathetically critical" of their subjects. Summers refers to his account as "decidedly sympathetic,"22 and describes a rereading of the
entire body of Fuller's work (apparently as part of the preparation of
his Instrumentalism treatise)23 as provoking a heightened regard for
Fuller's contribution to legal theory (p. vii). In theory, at least, this
process of undergoing a growing appreciation for the work of the subject offers an opportunity for the reader of this book to experience
second-hand the observations and insights that raised Fuller's stature
in the eyes of the author. But such a process holds out that opportunity only at the price of creating a pair of risks that Summers is not
always able to avoid.
The first and more serious risk is that the author who, over time,
comes to a conclusion different from one he had held at an earlier date
will overreact to the change in position. The critic converted to supporter may assume the mantle of the hagiographer. While Summers
usually keeps his enthusiasm under restraint, 24 there are instances of
gushing overstatement that raise at least some warning signs about
Summers' ability to present an objective appraisal of his subject. In
his concluding chapter, Summers refers to Fuller as "the greatest
proceduralist in the history of legal theory" (p. 151). While philosophy of law does not seem to me to be an activity that lends itself to the
kinds of comparisons more appropriately made about left-handed
pitchers, one who makes statements of this sort at least ought to recognize how the evaluation is undercut by other statements he has made.
For example, Summers earlier states:
Fuller did not develop a systematic account of the purposes that are essential to the definition of each basic process. Nor did he explain very
fully how far a necessary purpose may fail of embodiment or implementation before we can say the process no longer exists, or has become
20. See R. SUMMERS, INSfRUMENTALlSM AND AMERICAN LEGAL THEORY (1982).
21. See notes 13, 18 supra.
22. P. vii (emphasis added).
23. See note 20 supra.
24. Summers qualifies many of his assessments of Fuller. Fuller is described, for example, as
"[i]n his time • • . the leading standard-bearer of secular 'natural law' theory in the Englishspeaking world." P. 1 (emphasis added).

February 1985]

Summers on Fuller

723

some other kind of process. But he did offer many remarks on the purposes of different processes . . . . [Pp. 31-32.]

There is quite a gap between offering "remarks" on process and being
the greatest proceduralist in history, and in chapters devoted to
Fuller's work on legal processes, Summers simply fails to sustain
Fuller in the exalted position to which the concluding chapter elevates
him.
The other risk that is presented in an account by a convert is that
the process of conversion can be glossed over, with the new understanding or appreciation presented as a fait accompli. I suspect that
the reader would have benefited from a more thorough explanation of
what deficiencies the author had previously identified in Fuller's work,
and precisely how the rereading changed or corrected the earlier
views, or made the earlier objections less significant.
In an earlier appraisal of the first edition of Fuller's The Morality
ofLaw, 25 Summers concluded that Fuller had failed to establish that a
set of legality principles had to be characterized as moral principles.26
That criticism, if well supported, should strike at the heart of Fuller's
development of "the inner morality of law."27 In this book, Summers
apparently has come around to the view that Fuller's purported morality is a morality (pp. 33-41), but Summers' method of arriving at
that conclusion is not a service to Fuller or to the reader trying to
grasp the significance of the morality designation.
Summers first collapses the idea ~hat legality principles can constitute a morality into the idea that the legality principles "necessarily
translate into principles or values of moral worth" (p. 37). Then,
while acknowledging that the move is his rather than Fuller's, Summers identifies the citizen's "fair opportunity to obey the law" 28 as the
moral value that is secured by compliance with Fuller's principles of
legality. Summers attempts to reinforce this argument from fairness
with an argument from legitimacy. If a "lawgiver violates the principles oflegality, . . . the lawgiver . . . necessarily forfeits some governmental legitimacy. . . . Legitimacy is itself a moral value" (p. 38).
Left unstated is the basis on which the values Summers identifies assume the guise of moral values.
The arbitrariness of Summers' bridging of the gap between legal
principles and moral principles is demonstrated by his consideration of
a criticism that was directed at Fuller's principles. Summers cites an
exchange between Fuller and Wolfgang Friedmann in which Fuller
resists Friedmann's characterization of Fuller's principles as " 'mere
25.
26.
27.
28.

L. FuLLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (rev. ed. 1969) (1st ed. 1964).
Summers, Morality, supra note 19, at 127-30.
L. Fuller, supra note 25, at 42.
P. 37 (emphasis in original).
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conditions of efficacy' " (p. 37). Yet Summers himself had earlier
written:
A further reason for refusing to apply the halo word "morality" to the
author's principles of legality is that there is an apposite alternative:
They may be viewed as "maxims of legal efficacy" and maxims of this
nature are not, as such, conceptually connected with morality. If a person assembles a machine inefficiently, the result is inefficiency, not
immorality.29

If Summers' facile equation of the fairness of an opportunity to obey

the law and governmental legitimacy with morality is sufficient to turn
Fuller's principles into a morality oflaw, then the obvious step to have
taken would have been to state simply that inefficiency is immoral.
Labelling something moral is no more persuasive when done at one
remove, as Summers does, than when done directly, as Fuller did.
Summers recognizes in passing that the notion of "what ought to be"
is a notion "of some appropriate person or body" (p. 34), but the standard of appropriateness is not provided. Furthermore, recognizing
that "legal standards of content are frequently moral in character" (p.
35) tells us nothing about which standards have that quality. Summers' hypothesis that a necessary connection between validity and morality exists "[w]henever a rule, to qualify as valid law, must satisfy
tests of moral worth specified in standards of legal validity" (p. 35)
displays the twin failings of his attempt to protect natural law theory
from inanity: the ignoring of the necessity of human agency in the
formulation of a standard of validity that includes tests of moral
worth, and the overloading of the definable concept of legal validity
with indefinite notions of morals.
The danger that is associated with this moral overloading of validity is inadvertently displayed by Summers' attempt to extend the necessity of moral value to legal processes. Summers refers to "genuine
legislative processes of a democratic kind" as apparently including a
"right of parties potentially affected by a proposed law to a legislative
hearing in which they may try to influence the content of the legislation" (pp. 40-41). For at least seventy years, no such "right" has been
recognized in this country. 30 The question that is necessarily posed to
those who would infuse morality into validity concepts is whether the
legislative process in this country is thereby rendered immoral and/or
invalid. Summers' designation of the moral values that are secured by
the principles of legality is of little help in answering this question. A
hearing right has no effect on a "fair opportunity to obey the law," 31
but such a right arguably could be part of the contractarian "understanding'' that gives a government legitimacy (pp. 38, 84).
29. Summers, Morality, supra note 19, at 129.
30. See Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. Colorado, 239 U.S. 441 (1915).
31. P. 37 (emphasis in original).
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Summers' view raises a number of questions. What makes an opportunity to be heard by a legislature a right? Is it a right because a
hearing would be moral? I suspect that we would be better off if we
followed Fuller's lead and identified this procedural step as something
that ought to be provided. In that way, the proponent of a legislative
hearing would be able to make the instrumental arguments for the
desirability of a hearing, and those arguments could be evaluated on
their merits, without the distraction (and the potential failure) of a
leap from the undesirability to the immorality of proceeding without a
legislative hearing.
Even if we were to accept Summers' implicit conclusion that a legislative process that did not afford a hearing to affected parties is in
some sense immoral, the consequences of that conclusion are not at all
clear. Are the enactments of that legislative process invalid, immoral,
or both? If the members of the legislative body in fact consider all the
matters that would have been raised in legislative hearings, isn't the
hearing directed at another goal, namely, the inclusion of the citizenry
in the process of legislating? Are we then in the position of having to
add yet another statement to Summers' list of what is moral (e.g., "legitimacy" (p. 38)) and immoral (e.g., "injustice" (p. 37)), to the effect
that inclusion is a moral value?
Both Fuller and the reader would be better served by an introductory essay that is able to convey a deeper understanding of precisely
what Fuller was trying to do and why it was important. In overcoming his earlier objections to Fuller in the way that he displays in this
book, Summers proves to be unable to save Fuller from the force of
those and other objections in any meaningful way.
The criticisms of the book that center around Summers' blossoming enthusiasm for Fuller as a pivotal figure in jurisprudence provide
only part of the reason why Summers seems not to have been the ideal
choice to contribute a volume on Fuller to the Jurists series. A different set of criticisms, derived from Summers' attempts to develop a unified view of American legal theory, raises equally serious questions
about the Summers book.
During the course of the past decade, Professor Summers has developed at considerable length, 32 and with no small degree of sophistication, his hypothesis that the work of many prominent American
legal theorists of the first half of this century33 reflects a sort of
prototheory of law which he labels "pragmatic instrumentalism."34
32. See R. SUMMERS, supra note 20.
33. See id. at 22-26.
34. I do not understand Summers to be suggesting that a fully developed theory of law can be
found in the work of those theorists he identifies as pragmatic instrumentalists. Indeed, such a
suggestion would fly in the face of such disclaimers as that issued by Llewellyn, Some Realism
about Realism- Responding to Dean Pound, 44 HARv. L. REv. 1222 (1931). What Summers
appears instead to be doing is identifying certain concerns common to this set of theorists, and
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His fresh perspective on a group of scholars who have usually been
categorized as the American legal realists is bound to produce both a
renewed interest in this group of theorists and a heightened awareness
of the need to explore the responsibilities and consequences of operating at the level ofmetatheory. 35 However one might agree or disagree
with Summers' work on pragmatic instrumentalism, jurisprudence as
a whole should benefit from his efforts.
When Summers turns from his pet theory to the work of someone
who by all reasonable reckoning was outside of the movement, a potential trap is set for the reader who is unaware of the peculiar perspective from which Summers views American legal theory. In his
1978 essay on Fuller and the pragmatic instrumentalists, Summers
noted the desirability of accommodating Fuller's views within that
theory oflaw. 36 Four years later, Summers described Fuller as a major critic of American pragmatic instrumentalism. 37 Now, in a book
purporting to be about Fuller, Summers states that "Fuller stood . . .
on the side of the instrumentalists," but he simply "did not belong to
the realist wing of American pragmatic instrumentalism" (p. 4). The
reader who is attempting to obtain an understanding of Fuller must
consider the possibility that Fuller's views have undergone at least
some distortion in order to enable Summers to bring Fuller into a nonrealist "wing of American pragmatic instrumentalism." 38 Without
further warning or background, the reader is unable to separate what
is uniquely Summers' from a more mainstream depiction of the legal
and philosophical environment in which Fuller participated and
against which he reacted. 39
then developing on his own "something that qualifies as a general theory." R. SUMMERS, supra
note 20, at 11 (emphasis in original).
35. Compare Moore, The Need for a Theory of Legal Theories: Assessing Pragmatic Instru·
mentalism, 69 CoRNELL L. REv. 988 (1984), with Summers, On Identifying and Reconstructing a
General Legal Theory- Some Thoughts Prompted by Professor Moore's Critique, 69 CoRNELL L.
REv. 1014 (1984).
36. See Summers, Dominant Philosophy, supra note 19, at 433.
37. See R. SUMMERS, supra note 20, at 38.
38. Even if the change has occurred in Summers' conception of his theory, if all he is doing is
conflating instrumentalism with antiformalism, Summers achieves the integration of Fuller into
the instrumentalist camp only at the debasement of the theory. Ironically, this is a risk that
Summers appears to have recognized in 1978. See Summers, Dominant Philosophy, supra note
19, at 433. Fuller can be classified as an instrumentalist, see R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS
SERIOUSLY 4 (1977), but even that term begins to lose its significance if it begins to be used so
that it encompasses anyone who thinks law has a purpose.
39. I do not mean to suggest that Summers should be precluded from offering his own in·
sights into Fuller's work, particularly insights that reflect Summers' development of the prag·
matic instrumentalist theory. Both MacCormick and Morison provide good illustrations of how
carefully developed original insights can add to the depth and sophistication of the reader's understanding of the subject. See, e.g., N. MAcCoRMICK, supra note 1, at 96-102, 111-20; W.
MoRISON, supra note 1, at 178-205. What is essential for an introductory treatment of the sort
proper for a volume in this series is a demarcation of the line between the views of the subject and
the views of the author that is discernible by the reader who lacks a familiarity with the works of
both.
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The most serious (and the most inexcusable) shortcoming of Summers' book lies in his description of the major legal theory which
Fuller opposed and as an alternative to which he offered his version of
a natural law theory. No account of Fuller that purports to place
Fuller "in the context of [his] times and specific concerns"40 can avoid
at least a general description of legal positivism. Indeed, Summers undertakes a description of this view of law even prior to his presentation
of Fuller's own theory of law, in the belief that "this view as Fuller
conceived it will help us to understand why this general issue was such
a live one for him, and why his own theory cannot be dismissed as
platitudinous" (p. 16).
However, no book that is likely to find its way into the hands of a
reader who is relying on the book as part of an initial exposure to
jurisprudence ought to be permitted to present such a distorted view of
legal positivism as Summers provides here. Even when the distortion
is Fuller's,41 one of the responsibilities of the author of an introductory
text such as this is to correct the misperceptions of the terms of the
dispute created by the subject's misstatements and oversimplifications
of the opposing view. Otherwise, Fuller's theory would need to be
rescued not from dismissal as "platitudinous" but rather from the
charge that the theory is a trivial response to a positivist straw-man
with no realistic counterpart in contemporary legal thought.
At the heart of Summers' distortion of legal positivism is an inexplicable failure to comprehend the meaning that positivists attach to
the term "validity." Summers argues that a "source-based" test of
validity fails to capture the extent to which content is actually relevant
to the validity of "a lower-tier precept" (p. 44). As evidence of this
failure, Summers describes the apparent conflict between the sourcebased validity and the content-based validity of an unconscionable
contract, a will that conflicts with state governmental policy, an arbitrarily discriminatory statute, and a judicial precedent that is not
"good law" (p. 45). Setting aside for the moment the last example,
which is subject to its own peculiar difficulties, 42 each of the so-called
40. See text at note 13 supra.
41. In his initial description, Summers states that he is presenting a look at positivism "as
Fuller conceived it." P. 16. In his later, more fully developed treatment, Summers attributes to
Fuller the thesis that "the positivist quest for a general criterion by which the law could be
identified and differentiated must fail," and states that because "Fuller did not develop the [thesis] as fully as he might have," Summers will attempt "to elaborate it here faithfully to his evident intuitions (and also in a manner largely consistent with the anti-positivism of Dworkin)."
P. 42.
42. The meaning Summers assigns to the phrase "good law" displays some of the difficulties
of his attempt to portray the theory of judicial decisionmaking in a negative, antipositivist mold.
Earlier in the book, Summers appears to be including the test of "a precedent for minimal 'goodness' ('Is that good law?')" within those content standards which are based on morality. P. 35.
There and at this point in the book, Summers seems merely to be misusing the term "good law"
as a synonym for binding precedent that provides the solution to the dispute before the court.
However, Summers shortly thereafter makes it clear that the apparent confusion is in fact delib-
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content-oriented tests of legal validity is itself dependent on what a
positivist would have no difficulty describing as a source-based legally
valid rule. Contracts are unenforceable because of a legal rule of unconscionability,43 wills violate state governmental policy embodied in
properly enacted statutes,44 and statutes are set aside as discriminatory
under a federal or state constitutional provision.45 Summers fails to
distinguish between the validity of rules, which positivists purport to
be able to determine on a source-based standard, and the validity of
public and private acts, which must of course include reference to content-oriented standards, but to such standards as are found in or inferable from legally valid rules.
The more significant conceptual and practical questions tum on
the issue of how legal decisionmakers can and should select the content for specific rules and decisions. Presenting this issue as part of an
antipositivist agenda (pp. 54-57) entangles the reader in a law/morality dichotomy that need not be part of either the positivist or the natural law program. Summers describes the impossibility of
differentiating legal argumentation from moral argumentation (p. 55).
A differentiation can, of course, be made, but the questions become
why one would want to make the differentiation, and what one has
sought to prove by the distinction.
The distinction I would draw is based on use rather than content.
Legal argumentation consists of reasoning offered to affect a decision
by a legal decisionmaker. Within such argumentation, reasons derived
from various sources will have room to operate depending on the particular hierarchy of persuasiveness that has been established within the
system. If the reason for distinguishing legal from moral argumentation is to suggest that positivists ignore the latter, the suggestion is
absurd. It is true, however, that within the sphere of legal argumentation, reasons will have different weights, and decisionmakers will have
varying degrees of freedom to follow certain reasons. Without an understanding of the hierarchical structure of rules within a legal system,
both the observer and the participant will be totally unequipped to
erate, that "the standard of sufficient goodness is largely determined by moral notions," and that
the legal validity of a precedent depends on its becoming "settled" by passing a test that is based
in part on "general moral ideas of sufficient goodness 'outside the law' on which such standards
must continuously draw." P. 55. This exercise might have some point if Summers were ap·
preaching the issue that contemporary legal philosophers have joined under the headings of the
meaning of judicial discretion and whether legal questions always have right answers. See, e.g.,
R. DWORKIN, supra note 38, at 31-39, 81-130; Dworkin, No Right Answer?, in LAW, MORALITY,
AND SOCIETY: EssAYS IN HONOUR OF H.L.A. HART 58-84 (P. Hacker & J. Raz eds. 1977).
Summers indicates, however, that this is not Fuller's primary concern, p. 51, and thus the purpose seems to be simply to offer a further attack on the positivist straw-man whose theory oflegal
validity is unconcerned with content. P. 54.
43. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-302 (1972).
44. See, e.g., T. ATKINSON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF WILLS 135-38 (2d ed. 1953) (discussing the policy underlying statutes setting restrictions on charitable and religious devices).
45. See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 991-1146 (1978).
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understand to whom arguments should be addressed and along what
lines they should be structured in order to be most effective.
Summers' attempt to use the experience of the common law as
proof of the failure of the positivist quest involves him in a convoluted
tangle of uses of the word "law" that might well be better abandoned
than sorted out. The steps in the argument (p. 50) are essentially
these: (1) Common-law rules owe their status as law to "general acceptance and rational appeal," rather than to their "having been laid
down by prior judges;" (2) common-law rules are "sufficiently good to
become 'settled' law and therefore truly law" when their rational appeal "to subsequent judges and to the legal profession at large" gives
them a certain level of acceptance; 46 (3) common-law rules have the
status of law even before a judicial decision because (and here Summers must be quoted lest the reviewer be accused of intentionally parodying his views)
in my view, the grounds on which interpretational notions, custom, and
common law are received are very largely generalizable, are in fact so
generalized, and are widely understood within at least the legal profession. Thus for the law to be knowable in advance, it is simply not necessary to have the kind of system for which so many positivists seem to
have yearned - a system in which law is identifiable preferably by reference to the antecedent and authentic stamp of some authoritative originator. Law can be sufficiently identified by other means. 47

Summers' argument can be tested by taking a fairly common situation and seeing where the steps of his reasoning lead. Driver A and
driver B are in a two-car collision, in which B struck A's car from the
rear, and B wishes to sue A for damages for the personal injuries and
property damage suffered in the accident. The supreme court of the
state in which the accident occurred has consistently held to a common-law rule of contributory negligence. In recent years, nearly twothirds of the states have replaced contributory negligence with one of
three different forms of comparative negligence. The legislature of our
hypothetical state has considered but not enacted a comparative negligence bill in each of its last three sessions. In such a state of affairs, it
is difficult to believe that anyone could seriously contend that "the
law" in this jurisdiction is anything other than the most recent pronouncement to have received the "antecedent and authentic stamp of
some authoritative originator." If the state supreme court were to decide tomorrow to adopt a system of comparative negligence, would
that be the law of the state because of its "general acceptance and
rational appeal"? Would it become "good" or "settled" law only
when its rational appeal "to the legal profession at large" has pro46. This point is developed in a much more sophisticated manner by Ronald Dworkin as a
matter of tbe "gravitational force" of common law precedents. See R. DwoRKIN, supra note 38,
at 110-23.
47. P. 50 (emphasis in original).
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duced an (unspecified) level of acceptance? And before the court announced the comparative negligence rule, did that rule have the status
of law because it was "knowable in advance" at least within those segments of the legal profession which could see it coming?
Summers sketches a view of law by Gallup poll and horoscope. If
this be the alternative to positivism, give me positivism! I may thereby
reveal that I am deluding myself that I am "value-neutral" (p. 52),
show myself to be a moral skeptic (pp. 52-53), and demonstrate that I
am unhealthily preoccupied with a theory that does not fit the facts (p.
53). But I also know how B's case is going to be decided by a trial
court, to whom B should address arguments for change, and the binding effect of the change if it should occur. Failure to adopt Summers'
open-ended view of law does not in any way concede that the role of a
judge is "simply to do or die and seldom to reason why; his is generally to be an uncreative role" (p. 60). Yet that creativity takes place
within limits and subject to constraints. The distorted view of positivism Summers offers here is a poor substitute for a reasoned exploration
of the nature and location of those limits, and serves not at all the
important task of introducing the reader to what is significant in
Fuller's rejection of positivism.

III
The portrayal of Lon Fuller as one of the most influential American legal theorists of this century calls for some concluding thoughts
on what Fuller's work indicates about the agenda that American legal
theory addressed during the period of Fuller's work. In order to assess
the accomplishments of legal theory as represented in Fuller's writing,
a distinction between the reactive and the positive segments of that
work will be useful.
To the extent that Fuller's writing is reacting to what Summers
sees as a scientific mindset (pp. 53, 57, 63), it displays an essentially
sterile strain of American legal theory. The late nineteenth-century
legal science movement in this country was fundamentally different
from such later developments as Kelsen's pure theory of law. The
American legal scientists were essentially not concerned with the nature of law as a philosophical or intellectual phenomenon. Rather,
they were developing a formalistic method of legal decisionmaking
that would confine the decisionmakers within the parameters of syllogistic reasoning from a major premise that could be located in the relevant statutory or appellate case law. The realists reacted strongly and
effectively to that concept of decisionmaking. American legal philosophy outside of the "realist wing" (p. 4) makes no significant contribution if all it does is belabor the same point made by the realists.
Even the secular natural law which Fuller could have offered as an
alternative to the more sophisticated positivism of the post-realist era

February 1985]

Summers on Fuller

731

is essentially negative in character. Fuller's inner morality of law enables us to identify putative legal systems that are not what they seem
to be (p. ·n), but neither the observer nor the participant is otherwise
given standards against which to measure the validity of particular
enactments or pronouncements about individual laws. The barrenness
of Fuller's natural law is most apparent when compared with the creative work of a natural law proponent such as Ronald Dworkin, addressing the nature of judicial decisionmaking in light of a
constructive model for r~ching correct results.
Fuller's impressive studies of processes are a positive contribution
to our understanding of the possibilities and the limits of different
decisionmaking and ordering techniques. Such work, however valuable and illuminating it may be, is only tangentially jurisprudential in
nature, unless the concept of jurisprudence is so broadened that it includes all discussion of conflict resolution and resource allocation.
Fuller's views on custom, for example, undouptedly increase our appreciation of how individuals behave, but to say "that he expanded our
very concept of law" (p. 78) is to perpetuate the antipositivist dilemma, i.e., if we cannot and should not distinguish law from non-law,
who can object to the proposition that everything is law?
Summers' over-playing of the antipositivist vein in Fuller's work
creates a risk that Fuller and the bulk of midcentury American legal
theory will be dismissed as irrelevant. As long as American legal theory concerns itself excessively with attacks on a legal positivism resembling the simplistic notions of Austin (pp. 48-50), and offers only an
amorphous and indeterminate "morality" as the reference criterion for
decisions of difficult and controversial issues (chs. 3-4), the philosophy
of law generated in this country is likely to lag considerably behind its
British and Continental counterparts.
In his earlier text on ~erican legal theory, Professor Summers
distinguished the fox from the hedgehog, and adopted the stance of the
hedgehog which knows one great thing or which has the best trick of
all. 48 Considering the fundamentally unsound nature of Summers' introduction of the work of Lon Fuller, I suspect that both the subject
and the readers of the Jurists series would have been better served had
the hedgehog stuck to his pragmatic instrumentalist trick.

48. See R. SUMMERS, supra note 20, at 13. The image is developed with considerable richness in I. BERLIN, RUSSIAN THINKERS 22-81 (H. Hardy ed. 1978).

THE MORALITY OF OBEDIENCE
Joseph Raz*

A THEORY OF LAw. By Philip Soper. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press. 1984. Pp. ix, 190. $16.50.
Over the past few years Professor Soper has published several articles displaying an acute power of analysis, a fair-minded treatment of
the views of theorists for whom he has little sympathy, and a capacity
to cut through the detail of complex arguments and reach to their
heart. 1 In them he was moving towards an independent stance. This
elegantly written book contains the fruit of this search.
The book can be divided into three parts. The first, mainly in
chapter one, discusses method in legal philosophy. The second, consisting mainly of chapters two and five, unravels Soper's views on the
nature of law. The third, mainly in chapter three, is a completely new
argument for the existence of an obligation to obey the law- any law,
be it good or bad, just or unjust. Chapters four and six interpret and
support defenses of the novel doctrines advanced in the rest of the
book. Each of the main themes is introduced through a discussion of
the work of some of the theorists Soper disagrees with. The book in all
its parts is Soper's response to the challenge he addresses to all legal
and political theorists: What is the difference between law and a
merely coercive order? All other theories are found wanting. Either
they fail to identify the difference or they fail to explain it, they fail to
see its point. Soper's ambition is to remedy both defects. I will not try
to summarise the book, but will concentrate on the main message conveyed by each of its parts.
I.

PROBLEMS OF METHOD

Soper's novel theory of law belongs to the recently fast-expanding
family of theories holding that the answer to the question "what is
law?" depends at least in part on evaluative considerations. But perhaps uniquely among adherents of this approach, he believes in the
viability of the alternative approach. It is possible, he implies, though
pointless, to inquire into the question "what is law?" in a way that is
devoid of evaluative presuppositions. It is here, I shall argue, that he
* Fellow of Balliol College, Oxford. D.Phil. 1967. - Ed.
1. See, e.g., Soper, Legal Theory and the Problem ofDefinition (Book Review), 50 U. CHI. L.
REv. 1170 (1983); Soper, Metaphor:s and Models ofLaw: The Judge as Priest, 15 MicH. L. REv.
1196 (1977); Soper, Legal Theory and the Obligation of a Judge: The Hart/Dworkin Dispute, 15
MICH. L. REv. 473 (1977).
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goes astray. Perhaps paradoxically, this mistake leads him to misidentify and exaggerate the role of evaluative considerations in a theory of
law.
Trouble starts with the first introductory chapter. Soper raises the
question which has always proved to be the Achilles' heel of philosophy: What is it good for? His answer is that there is no possible point
to legal philosophy if it is not to answer the question "what ought one
to do?" From this he concludes without further ado that its task is to
answer the question: "What is law that I should obey it?" Indeed he
sees this as no more than a restatement of "what ought I to do?" (p.
7). The question "what is law?" which is addressed in the rest of the
book is understood as a quest for such a description of the law which
will make obedience to it obligatory. The first step towards a theory
was accomplished. One fundamental tenet of law was discovered:
Necessarily, law is such that it is obligatory to obey it.2 I shall call this
Soper's basic maxim.
Chapters four and six show that he does not regard the methodological argument for the basic maxim as sufficient. While the basic
maxim is one of the main props for his theory of law, its own acceptability depends on the acceptability of his legal and political doctrines.
The whole argument of the book hangs together. One result of this is
that my strictures on the basic maxim depend on the cogency of my
rejection of the other theses of the book. Still one has to start somewhere, and what better place can there be than Soper's own starting
point.
Soper is quite modest about his claim. He thinks that at the end of
the day whether or not the law il) such that it is necessarily the case
that one has an obligation to obey it is like the question whether the
drawing which can be seen as either duck or rabbit is a drawing of a
duck or of a rabbit. 3 It is not clear, however, whether Soper is really
seeing a duck or a rabbit. Let us assume that the purpose of legal
theory is to advance the inquiry into what we ought to do. Does it
follow th~t describing the essential features of law as a political system
of authoritative rules, determining, among much else, when the use of
force is permissible, prejudges the issue (p. 10)? On the contrary, there
can be no progress in deciding what is to be done in the political
sphere except by focusing attention on the prominent features of social
institutions, features which may make a difference to the issue of
obedience.
If the law is to be obeyed it is because of its character as a system
(contributing to) organizing social relations by special means or
2. This conclusion is implicit in Soper's revised statement of the question: What is law that I
should obey it? See alsop. 13 ("I believe that the phenomenon of prima facie obligation is universally associated with the institution of law . . . .").
3. P. 14. See generally ch. 6.
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through the operation of special institutions. If it ought not to be
obeyed then this too is due to those same facts. By identifying the law
at the outset as a system we are obligated to obey, Soper does not
advance the inquiry. He does not provide us with any considerations
which may determine what ought to be done. We are offered by him
the advice: If an act is required by law, then, other things being equal,
we are obligated to perform it. But we pay a high price for it. We lose
our grip on the question "what is required by law?" We thought, and
Soper appears to endorse this thought (p. 2, and elsewhere), that at
least the answer to this is clear. Law is a system of rules which are
recognised and used by some or all of its subjects. We have ways of
identifying the ways they do so. We may travel to Outer Mongolia, to
Chile, to South Africa, to Uganda, or to any other country in the
world. While being ignorant of many nice questions concerning its
law we will find it rather easy to identify its central legal institutions
and regulations.
Not so if we accept Soper's basic maxim. This will require us first
to establish whether those regulations ought, morally speaking, to be
obeyed. Only if we are duty-bound to obey them (or perhaps only if
that country's citizens are so obligated) are they law. The question of
the existence of a moral obligation is not one we can answer simply by
observing which are the country's legislative and judicial institutions.
It is not a matter on which we can take the word of the country's
lawyers or citizens as settling the issue. Even if they accept Soper's
theory of law we cannot assume that their judgment of whether they
are living under a legal system is trustworthy. It is quite posible that
the vast majority of those subject to Nazi rule thought that Nazi rules
ought to be obeyed. It is more than possible that if they did, they were
badly in the wrong.
If we follow Soper we will find that legal theory does not tell us
what is the law of Germany or France or of any other country, for that
. is not its job, nor does Soper claim that it is. But equally the views and
conduct of the legal officials of those countries, the opinions and actions of its legal profession and of its citizens, will not determine what
is its law. If the identity and content of the law of a country cannot be
determined by reference to the opinions and conduct of the population, the legal profession and the legal institutions of that country,
then we are as far from knowing what we ought to do as we ever were.
Soper's basic maxim, far from advancing our understanding of what
we ought to do, blocks our way to answering that question.
Where then did Soper go wrong? Why did he not see that the road
to an answer to his main question, "what ought to be done?", goes
through solving a whole series of subsidiary questions each of which
advances us some of the way? We need to know the economic concomitants and the emotional make-up of monogamous marriages
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before we can judge whether we ought to get married or not. We must
establish the consequences of training in academic institutions and of
apprenticeship methods of training before we can judge which form of
training to prefer for ourselves or for others. Similarly, we ought to
establish the prominent features of law as a political system before we
can decide whether it ought to be obeyed.
The methodological separateness of the question "what is the
law?" from the question "ought it to be obeyed?" does not mean that
the answer to the first does not advance the second. On the contrary,
the first must be separate from the second in order to advance it. As I
mentioned at the outset, Soper's mistake is to think that if the questions are separate they are unconnected. For him the view that one can
provide a theory of what the law is without advance commitment to a
particular answer to the question "ought it to be obeyed?" means that
the theory of law is not in any way tied to the normative quest. This is
a deep mistake. A theory of what the law is strives to identify its
central, prominent, important features. What makes a feature prominent or important or central is inescapably and inevitably an evaluative question. It is important if it bears on what matters. In large
measure it is precisely the fact that certain features are relevant to
what one ought to do which marks their importance.
It is crucial to remember, however, that we can and often do know
that a feature of a scheme or an institution is relevant to its evaluation
without knowing whether it makes it good or bad. The fact that primary education is compulsory is recognised by all as important to its
evaluation, regardless of whether they take it to be one of the strengths
or a weakness of our educational arrangements.
In recent publications I have argued for a theory of law based on
these methodological perceptions.4 But they are far from new. While
not all the theorists generally identified as legal positivists endorsed
them, they stood at the cradle of legal positivism. Bentham never disguised the fact that his utilitarianism was the spring of some, though
not of all, of his main jurisprudential doctrines. His doctrine of the
individuation of laws and his views on the natural arrangement of the
law, for example, are directly dependent on his utilitarian faith. Significantly, both are designed to bring out aspects of the law which are
of practical concern, without prejudging whether they show the law to
be good or bad. 5
A theory of law is, as Soper and others claim, tied to the normative
quest. But the tie to be productive must be partial and indirect. Gen4. See THE CoNCEPT OF A LEGAL SYSTEM 213-16 (2d ed. 1980); THE AUTHORITY OF LAW
37-52 (1979); Law, Authority and Morality, THE MONIST, forthcoming July, 1985; The Problem
about the Nature of Law, 21 W. ONTARIO L. REv. 203 (1983).
5. See J. BENTHAM, A FRAGMENT ON GOVERNMENT (2d ed. London 1823) (1st ed. n.p.
1776).
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eral evaluative considerations inform us what features are relevant to
the question "what ought one to do?". We then look to the law, as a
social institution familiar in our culture, the likes of which is also to be
found in other countries of different cultures, and see how it fares in
terms of these features. Once that is done we have answered the question "what is law?" in a way which advances our ability to decide
whether we ought to obey it, without prejudging it.

II.

MISUNDERSTANDINGS

The above simplified account of the way the normative quest affects the theory of law is much too crude. But it serves to vindicate
my opening remark that Soper's failure to see that the theoretical inquiry into the nature of law is indissolubly impregnated with evaluative presuppositions leads him to misconceive the role such
presuppositions should play in it. It also prevents him from seeing the
force of theories he is most concerned to criticize. While I do not wish
to comment in detail on Soper's review of the leading theories of today, it is necessary to show how the distortion embedded in the basic
maxim sometimes leads to misinterpretation.
The task of criticism is discharged in chapter two. Its first half
deals in some detail with several major tenets of Austin's, Kelsen's and
Hart's legal theories (and with some views of mine). The second summarises his critique of theories of this kind, introduces his own view
and dismisses in a rather summary fashion both Fuller and Dworkin.
Of the two the first half is by far the better. It displays the full
power of Soper's mind, his penetrating insight which fastens on toessentials, uncovers unstated presuppositions, and highlights connections and continuities in the various philosophical traditions. He
writes for those familiar with the work of the theorists under consideration. All those who have the required knowledge to appreciate his
arguments will find the works discussed illuminated by the penetrating
beam of Soper's searching gaze. And yet, unfortunately, even that impressive discussion is marred by some important distortions and misunderstandings. Let me give a few examples.
Soper claims that Hart must justify his view that acceptance of the
rule of recognition by the officials is a necessary feature of law by
showing that this feature is important given human concerns and interests. He thinks that Hart's answer "is the suggestion that the puzzled or ignorant person might want to conform to society's
expectations regardless of accompanying sanctions" (p. 24). By this
Soper means conformity for conformity's sake. This greatly distorts
Hart's meaning. His point is that to understand society one has to see
it as members of that society see it. Legal officials do not see themselves as gunmen writ large. They accept the system. That fact is
understood in the society at large. This is not an empirical generaliza-
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tion but a conceptual truth. Law is a public institution the general
features of which (i.e., the features which make it law) are known to
the public (though the public may not think of them as the features
which account for the legal character of the law). Hart does not spell
out but takes for granted that we all know that the difference between
an institution resting on acceptance and one resting on the threat of
resort to physical force is relevant to many human concerns. Clearly
whether one wishes to judge (morally or otherwise) the behaviour of
the officials, or to judge the viability of the institution, or to judge its
likely response to various contingencies, one would be greatly influenced by whether it rests on acceptance or on force.
Soper is right to say that the difference will be important to those
subject to the law who wish to decide whether they ought to obey it.
But Hart does not suggest that the difference is more important to the
ignorant than to the wise, nor that it is relevant only to those whose
instinct is to follow the herd. He was merely pointing out the existence of such people. Because they do exist an account oflaw is correct
only if it makes room for them. An account based on a stronger notion of recognition, one which claims that the law exists only if its
subjects believe in moral reasons for the validity of its rules, is vitiated
by not making room for such people.
Soper's mistake is typical, for it shows how his single-minded concentration on the question of why one should obey the law blinds him
to the existence of wider human interests. Similarly, his implied assertion that according to Hart it is desirable that both officials and subjects have "normative allegiance" to the law 6 is a lapse which may
betray a fundamental misunderstanding of Hart's theory. Hart does
indeed say that acceptance of the rule of recognition by officials is a
necessary feature of law. But he neither says nor implies that it is
desirable that they or other members of the community should have
this attitude. To say so is, according to Hart, not to explain the concept of law but to commend the existence of law and to commend
obedience to it wherever it exists. For all we know from Hart's theory
of law he may be a radical anarchist who regards any attitude of normative allegiance as thoroughly immoral.
Similar misunderstandings plague the second part of chapter two
as well. They are aggravated by Soper's tendency to lump all the theories he disagrees with into one or two archetypes. Soper's adversary is
the legal theorist or the positivist. It turns out that the positivist
thinks that an obligation to obey cannot exist without coincidence of
normative outlook (p. 40, and elsewhere). Soper agrees that this cannot mean that the positivist believes that the law is to be obeyed only if
it has some moral merit. Coincidence of normative outlook means
agreement in judgment about the merit of a law; it means that one is
6. See p. 38 (toward the foot of the page).
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obligated to obey only laws which are just and good. I know of no one
who held such a view. All the political and moral theorists I have any
acquaintance with held that either consent or the fear that disobeying
bad laws may lead to breakdown of law and order are grounds of
obligation.
It also appears to Soper that "the legal theorist's determination to
remain neutral" on the question whether there is an obligation to obey
"equates belief with reality: all that is necessary for a system to be
normative in the appropriate legal sense is for officials to display the
appropriate normative belief, however false or even insincere" (p. 49).
If the appropriate legal sense of normativity means a moral obligation
to obey the law then anyone who says that belief in an obligation entails its existence is indeed guilty of confusing belief with reality. But
he could hardly be accused of neutrality on the issue whether such an
obligation exists. If, on the other hand, the legal sense of normativity
is that the law is normative because it rests on acceptance, and not on
force, then the theorist is neutral but far from confusing belief with
reality he is at pains to keep them apart.
Misunderstandings of the same kind appear elsewhere in the book.
One example will serve. Soper seems to attribute to Kelsen the view
that law differs from organised coercion because it rests on the general
belief of the subject population in its justice (pp. 31, 95). But Kelsen
was anxious to dissociate himself from such views. 7 The beauty and
subtlety of Kelsen's view is that he believed that, like beauty, normativity is in the eye of the beholder. Those who interpret a coercive
system as a system of law regard it as normative. They presuppose the
basic norm, i.e., the rule that the law is valid and ought to be obeyed.
Kelsen is uncommitted as to whether all or any of the law's subjects
make this presupposition. It is not part of the conditions for the existence of law that they do, and certainly not that they should.

III. A

THEORY OF LAW

I have claimed that the foundations of legal theory are necessarily
value-laden and that this fact was recognised by some of the founding
fathers of legal positivism. It was recognised by Bentham, who also
saw that evaluative considerations may well lead to the endorsement
of a value-free criterion for the identification of the law. What is law
and what is not is a matter of fact. That it is a matter of fact is determined, in part, by evaluative considerations. Soper, I have claimed,
makes the existence of law a moral question, and thus he contradicts
his own view that what is law is determined by the views, attitudes and
actions of those subject to the law. Examination of this point is neces7. See H. KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW 7, 218 & n.83 (2d ed. 1967).
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sary to vindicate my comments in section one, and will lead us into the
heart of Soper's theory of law.
Soper is aware that a theory of law which defines it as necessarily
moral, that is, a theory of law based on what I described as his own
basic maxim, is untenable. He distinguishes between his own theory
and some other natural law theories: "Instead of defining law to ensure that it always obligates, one seeks an account that explains why it
has any tendency to obligate at all. In this way an independent concept of law is preserved, distinct from that of morality" (p. 59). I shall
refer to this as Soper's methodological principle. As Soper himself
observes, it is essentially the approach which I dubbed "the derivative
approach": 8 "That is, my claim is not that 'law' is itself a moral concept, like 'justice,' but that, like 'promise,' it is identified by nonmoral
features (supreme force and belief in justice) which necessarily have
moral worth" (p. 92).
Soper then proceeds to suggest that I reject the derivative approach. This is a mistake. While discussing various conditions that
the derivative approach must meet, my purpose was neither to criticise
nor to endorse it9 but to point out that it is compatible with some of
the tenets of legal positivism. Indeed it is compatible with the only
essentially positivist thesis that I was willing to endorse, namely the
"sources thesis." The sources thesis asserts that the identification of
the content and existence of the law is a matter of fact. This is precisely Soper's own assertion, or implication, in the two previous quotations from his book. If his theory lived up to his own aspirations it
could join the list of other natural law theories, like those of Fuller and
Finnis, 10 which are compatible with the sources thesis, thus vindicating my claim that it is a mistake to think that the legal positivist and
the natural law traditions are inherently incompatible.
By endorsing the basic maxim Soper contradicts his own description of his own theory. He endorses the definitional approach which
precisely does "define law to ensure that it always obligates." The
tension between these two incompatible methodological positions
shows at the heart of his explanation of law.
The book contains a one page section entitled "A Theory of Law."
Its distilled message is: "Legal systems are essentially characterised by
8. The derivative approach regards the existence of law as a matter of fact and proceeds to
argue that, given valid moral premises, the facts necessary for the existence of law assure it of
some moral value. Whether or not this claim, strictly interpreted, is true, the thought of a legal
system devoid of all moral merit is no less fantastic than the thought of a legal system which is
perfect beyond improvement. It is surely the case that all legal systems have both merits and
demerits. My objection was to the belief that if all legal systems have some moral merit then it
follows that there is an obligation to obey them. See J. RAz, PRACTICAL REAsoN AND NORMS
165-70 (1975).
9. See id.
10. See generally Soper, Legal Theory and the Problem ofDefinition, supra note 1 (review of
J. FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS (1980)).
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the belief in value, the claim in good faith by those who rule that they
do so in the interests of all . . . . Law combines the organised sanction with the claim to justice by those who wield the sanction" (p. 55).
I shall follow Soper and will refer to the quotation as Soper's theory of
law. Is this theory inconsistent with legal positivism as Soper claims?
Since belief in value may be misplaced, since what a person believes is
essentially on the factual side of the fact/value divide, the theory appears to be a positivistic one making the existence and contents of law
depend exclusively on matters of fact.
Compare, for example, Soper's theory oflaw with my views on the
matter (which he regards as a species of positivism). I am not the first
to have argued that "the law claims authority. The Law presents itself
as a body of authoritative standards." 11 Soper's theory seems to differ
from my view in two respects. First, he claims whereas I do not that a
system of rules is a legal one only if the people in authority believe in
the claim to authority which the law makes. Second, he attributes to
those in authority, and I do not, the belief that they govern in the
interest of all. Of these (and the context of our respective remarks
makes clear that they are the only) differences between these views of
ours, the first is real but apparently insignificant, and the second, significant but apparent only. Let me explain.
Whatever mileage Soper hopes to make out of the first difference in
constructing his argument for an obligation to obey the law, its real
significance is minimal. He agrees that ordinary common sense is unlikely to deny a legal system that status on the ground that its officials
are all too often hypocritical in their profession ofbeliefin the value of
the system they operate. 12 It would be readily admitted on the one
hand that a legal sytem all of whose officials are entirely and systematically hypocritical is a most unlikely possibility, and on the other hand
that it is more than likely that in many countries some legal officials
are hypocritical. Either way, whether it is an essential feature of law
that its officials believe in its value or merely that they claim that they
do, both properties are on the factual side of the fact/value distinction.
Thus, the first difference between Soper and myself is apparently
rather insignificant and fails to show where he deviates from welltested positivist paths.t3
Soper's assertion that law exists only if the rulers claim to rule in
the interests of the governed marks a more substantial disagreement
between us. In arguing that a claim to a right to rule is a mark of law,
I was mindful of the possibility of theocratic states whose governments
govern in pursuit, as they see it, of divine commands and interests
which may radically conflict with the interests of the governed. The
11. J. RAz, 'THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 33 (1979).
12. See, e.g., pp. 154-61.
13. But see p. 742 infra for my explanation of why this appearance is misleading.
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latter may be regarded as immaterial except when they coincide with
the higher interests or happen to serve them. I was also aware of the
theoretical possibility of a government coming to the conclusion, as
did Moses regarding the whole generation of the Israelites in the desert, that the interests of a whole generation have to be sacrificed for
the sake of future generations. On a plain reading of Soper's theory of
law (as explained on p. 55) such societies are not governed by law.
They fail to qualify not because of the atrocities they perpetrate (remember that the sacrificial policies they pursue may be enthusiastically supported by the entire population), but because of the morality
their rulers uphold.
As the following chapters make clear, this important disagreement
between Soper and me is only apparent. Soper notes that slaves and
conquered people are often oppressed by regimes that believe in the
justification of slavery and other forms of exploitation and oppression.
Officials who accept the beliefs that underlie such moral judgments are
acting in the interests of justice and fairness as they see it, and in that
sense in the interests of all (including the disadvantaged group . . . .)
Thus, tempting though it may be to derive a substantive constraint from
a theory that requires acting in the interests of all, the constraint is
empty, as formal equality always is. [P. 121.]

The temptation here mentioned is indeed to be resisted. But not for
the reason stated. Soper seems to misunderstand his own theory. His
theory of law does not establish a right that governments should act in
the interest of the governed, nor does it establish a duty on them to do
so. It merely claims that if they do not, then they are coercive orders
rather than legal ones. He gives no reason to think that coercive orders cannot do a lot of good, nor does he attempt to show that they are
not, in some circumstances, preferable to legal orders. The fact that
we all take for granted that normally the reverse is the case is neither
here nor there.
The temptation Soper mentions should indeed be resisted. But the
interest of the passage I quoted lies elsewhere, for it withdraws the
only aspect of his definition of law which separates his view from
mine. Soper, it seems, has an idiosyncratic view of people's interests.
It is a commonplace that morality sometimes calls on people to sacrifice their own interests for the sake of others. Soper disagrees. On the
evidence of the passage quoted above, it appears that he thinks that a
soldier who volunteers, out of moral conviction, to go to a certain
death in order to save his friends is really pursuing his own interest,
which happens to be to sacrifice himself. 14 Given that understanding
of people's interests, Soper's theory of law amounts to saying that
14. Soper's argument at pp. 149-50 suggests that if my volunteer acts for other reasons he
may not actually be pursuing his own self interest. Soper says there that a tyrant who puts his
own interest above morality (which in the circumstances imagined requires him to rule in the
interest of his subjects) is not acting in their interest even though he believes himself to be acting
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"legal systems are essentially characterized by . . the claim in good
faith by those who rule that they do so" (p. 55) in pursuit of valid
moral principles (whether or not these serve the interest of the governed in the ordinary understanding of such interests).
Am I saying that Soper's theory is really a familiar variant of legal
positivist themes? Not quite. My claim is that the distinctive part of
his theory of law is not in the doctrine he calls his theory of law but in
his theory of natural rights. The latter theory is explained in chapter
five, which is misleadingly entitled "Applications." In fact, this chapter introduces for the first time a doctrine which, while being presupposed by the political principle explained in chapter three, is not
supported by it. This doctrine lies at the heart of Soper's philosophy
and is one of his two major novel theses in the book. 15
Natural rights "are rights against the state which can be invaded
or ignored only at the cost oflosing the title oflaw" (p. 132). Note the
accuracy of this explanation. Natural rights are moral rights, and to
establish their validity as rights one resorts to moral argument; one
consults, as it were, one's moral theory. Moral rights are natural ones
because they coincide with the necessary conditions without which a
social order is not a legal but a coercive one. 16 Hence, the doctrine of
natural rights reveals Soper's view of the necessary features of law. It,
more than his theory of law, illuminates the difference, according to
him, between a legal and a coercive order.
Soper claims to discern two such rights: a right to "that minimum
of security that underlies the judgment that any legal system is better
than none" (p. 130), and a right to discourse (pp. 134-43). Soper says
little about the content of his alleged natural rights. My main difficulty is not, however, with their content but with the reasons for
thinking that they are natural rights in the sense explained.
So far as I can see Soper has one argument for the naturalness of
the right to security and two in support of the naturalness of the right
to discourse. I emphasise that naturalness is the only issue Soper discusses because his way of writing may mislead many readers into taking him to claim that he has established the existence of rights to
correctly and justifiably. The difference is, presumably, that he does not think that it is morality
which calls on him to prefer his interests to those of his subjects.
15. I assume that his statement that the court is "an institution the primary function of
which is to assume this responsibility of justifying the manner in which sanctions are imposed
and disputes resolved" (p. 113) only sounds novel because of its rhetorical exaggeration. Presumably Soper would admit that the difference between a department of information and propa·
ganda and a court is that while both explain the way sanctions are applied and disputes resolved,
only the second applies sanctions and resolves disputes.
Another controversial thesis he endorses is that "the essential difference between court and
legislature consists in the constraint placed on the former, but not on the latter, to reach decisions in accordance with preexisting (presumably legal) standards. Judges find the law; legislatures make it" (p. 110). Unfortunately Soper does not explain or defend this claim.
16. See pp. 130, 132.
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security and discourse against all governments, rights which are legally binding independently of any legislation or judicial recognition.
Nothing could be further from the truth. Soper assumes without argument that people have rights to minimum security and to discourse
against their government. He argues that these are natural rights, that
is, that a government which violates them would be administering a
system of coercion rather than law. But nowhere does he argue that
natural rights are legal rights. All his argument purports to show is
that the rights are not violated in law. But rights can remain inviolate
without being recognised as rights. A country which does not have
conscription, to give but one example, does not violate anyone's right
of conscientious objection, assuming people have such a moral right.
It does not follow that it recognises a legal right of conscientious objection. For all that Soper tells us neither of his natural rights need be
legal rights.
Let us tum to Soper's arguments for the naturalness of his two
natural rights. The reason to regard the right to minimum security as
a natural one is that without such security, having a system of law is
no better than having no such system. Therefore, as we shall see below, if there could be such a law undermining minimum security,
there would be no obligation to obey it. This contradicts the basic
maxim (i.e., that law is such that it is obligatory to obey it). Therefore
there can be no such law. The startling aspect of this argument is that
it flatly contradicts Soper's methodological principle. It now turns out
that organised force and the rulers' belief in the moral rightness of
their actions is not enough to assure a social order of legal status. It
may still be nothing but a gunman situation writ large unless it also
assures one of minimum security.
Soper gives us no reason to believe that a social order meeting the
only two conditions stipulated by his theory of law cannot infringe
people's right to minimum security. On the contrary, he seems to recognize that it can do so.H He needs not a contingent argument, like
Hart's, to the effect that law which systematically violates minimum
security is unlikely to survive. He needs a conceptual argument establishing the conceptual impossibility of there being law which infringes
the right to security. The only argument Soper makes is that one
would not be obligated to obey it were it to exist. Thus, Soper is impaled on the horns of a dilemma. Either he gives up his methodological principle and admits that his conception of natural law is
definitional - he identifies the essential features of the law because of
their moral significance, and their moral significance is his only reason
for regarding them as essential to law. Or he has to abandon his basic
maxim and concede that it is not necessarily the case that there is an
17. Seep. 183 n. 15 & 17 (The case of slaves whose interests are sacrificed: for them no
personal security is assured.).
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obligation to obey the law. The question "what is law that I should
obey it?" has no answer, for it rests on a false premise.
Soper's arguments for the naturalness of the right to discourse fare
no better. One relies on an empirical generalisation: rulers who deny
the right to discourse are unlikely to be sincere believers in the moral
rightness of their own actions (p. 135). Whatever one may think of
this as an empirical generalisation is immaterial. The naturalness of
the right can be established only by an exceptionless conceptual necessity. The second argument is to the effect that denial of a right to
discourse shows that the rulers do not respect their subjects (pp. 13640). This lack of respect absolves the subjects of the obligation to obey
the law, according to the political theory to be discussed below. From
here the argument is identical to that for the right to security. If there
could be such a law it would be a law one is not obligated to obey.
Therefore, it would contradict the basic maxim. Therefore it cannot
exist. Violation of the right to discourse can be purchased, then, only
at the price of losing the right to the title of law. Therefore, the right
to discourse is a natural right.
Given these premises, so it is. Unfortunately the premises land
Soper again in the same dilemma. He must either drop his methodological principle and allow that he holds certain features to be essential for law for no other reason than that they endow it with moral
value, or he must discard his basic maxim and allow for the existence
of non-obligating law.
It may be worth noting that Soper holds that respect for their subjects is a conceptual condition of the sincerity of the rulers' belief in
the moral justification of their actions. His notion of sincerity is such
that it is impossible for rulers both sincerely to believe in the moral
justification of their actions and to lack respect (that is, lack therespect which expresses itself in the right of discourse) for their subjects.
So whether a person is sincere or not turns out not to be a matter of
fact, but of morality. Something like the following may be a generalised statement of the principle Soper seems to presuppose: Only those
who respect others are capable of having sincere beliefs on the morality of action affecting those others. Given this interpretation of sincerity (though I am unclear as to why Soper adopts it), the first
apparently innocuous difference between his theory of law and my
view of the matter turns out to be of major significance.
IV.

THE OBLIGATION TO OBEY THE LAW

It is plain, on the other hand, why Soper thinks that respect for the
subjects is a condition of legality. His argument for an obligation to
obey the law, the second major innovation of the book, depends on it.
Three premises entail a prima facie obligation to obey the law (pp. 78,
80):
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(1) "[T]he enterprise of law in general- including the particular system, defective though it may be, that confronts an individual- is better
than no law at all."
(2) There is "a good faith effort by those in charge to govern" in the
light of valid moral principles. [This second premise understood in Soper's special way includes, as we saw above, a further premise:]
(3) The rulers respect the ruled.

The advantage of law over no law at all is, according to Soper, that
law secures minimum safety. He consciously endorses a Hobbesian
position on this issue in order to make sure that he does not pitch his
claim for the law too high. Much needs be said about Soper's premises. Having discussed them briefly in the previous section we should,
however, press on. Do the premises support his conclusion? His conclusion is very far-reaching. It will establish not merely an obligation
to obey the law in an essentially decent society; it reaches further and
asserts an obligation to obey any legal system which observes his two
natural rights. At times Soper makes it appear as if these conditions
establish quite a lot, as if they establish mutuality of respect between
rulers and their subjects and the genuine attempt by the rulers to further the interests of all their subjects in a rational, reasoned and openminded way. Most of the time, however, Soper is cautious enough to
warn against such a reading of his theory. Though law necessarily
observes the two natural rights, they are very minimal. It appears, for
example, that even Nazi Germany conformed to the conditions of legality sufficiently to impose on most of its subjects an obligation to
obey (p. 92). Can his meagre premises support so strong a conclusion?
Can the obligation to obey depend to such an extent on the convictions
of the rulers, regardless of the morality of their actions?
Soper's basic idea is simple. There is a job that needs to be done,
the job of government. Someone is faithfully trying to do it. Other
things being equal, such a person deserves one's respect. So far so
good. The problem starts when we try to understand why that respect
involves an obligation to obey the law. I believe that Soper is trading
on two recognised sources of respect and obligation. First there is respect for an enterprise which is not merely a valuable enterprise, but
also my enterprise. Every individual's attitude toward his own government should be not merely that they have a job which they are
doing their best to carry out. There is a common enterprise in which
both rulers and subjects should engage, the enterprise of promoting
the good of the community. The rulers are trying to do their share.
They may be failing, but at least they are trying in good faith. Their
failure does not violate one's natural rights, and therefore has not deprived the common enterprise of all its point. It is in this spirit that
Soper refers to respect for law based on "equal commitment to the
search for truth and humility about the correctness of one's conclu-
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sions" (p. 82). 18
The second recognised source of obligation Soper is invoking is the
duty not to frustrate and upset people who are doing their best. They
deserve that one should spare their feelings. The rulers would be hurt
and offended if their best efforts on our behalf were to be met with
rebuff in the form of disobedience. Therefore one is (prima facie) obligated to obey in order to spare their feelings. In this vein, which
dominates in the book, Soper observes that while "disobedience cannot easily be linked to societal disintegration; . . . it can be linked in
an ascending scale of sadness, disappointment, concern, anxiety, and
fear on the part of those who think the laws are important and my
obedience desirable" (p. 86). Therefore, the more they care about my
compliance the stronger my duty is to comply (pp. 87, 153).
I can see no way of merging these two underlying strands, if indeed
I am right to find them in Soper's argument. Moreover, neither of
them can support Soper's conclusion. Respect for law out of a sense
of participation in a joint enterprise is, in its proper place, a real moral
concern. It should indeed lead one to uphold laws which one finds to
be less than ideal. One reason is the humility and the sense of one's
own fallibility that Soper mentions. Another is the fact that, in many
cases in which one's action makes a difference to a joint enterprise, one
does more to promote the good and prevent evil by supporting the
partners to that enterprise than by opposing them. Soper is aware that
this last consideration cannot be the foundation of an obligation to
obey the law, however weak.
First, it is simply not the case that one's actions in breaking the law
always make a difference to the enterprise. Quite often they do not.
Furthermore, it is not necessarily the case that citizens and governments are engaged in a joint enterprise. The divergence of opinion
about morality between me and a Nazi government or between me and
a fundamentalist Muslim government is so great that I would deny
that just because they believe in the rightness of their action there is
some joint pursuit in which we are partners (assuming that I am their
subject).
Nor is Soper's argument from humility and fallibility any help.
While aware of one's own fallibility one is also aware of the fallibility
of the government. One should be cautious in believing oneself right
and the rest of the world wrong, especially in matters in which others
have greater expertise or experience or judgment. We discount our
own opinions for such reasons many times every day. But we judge
the action of others and their credentials before we trust them. Do the
18. At times Soper sounds as if he sees the situation as one in which respect for law is merely
the pursuit of long-term self-interest, see p. 84, but such passages are really concerned with the
truth of the premises of his argument enumerated above. They are liable to mislead if read as
explanations of why those premises support the conclusion.
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considerations of humility show that one should support racist policies, even if only prima facie? Would not such support make one participant to a racist enterprise? I confess that neither these nor any
other examples can really carry the day against a claim that there is a
prima facie obligation. All objections seem easy to deflect on the
ground that they merely show that the obligation is overridden, not
that it does not exist. But certain forms of racism and other iniquities
perpetrated by legal systems all over the world, even those which meet
Soper's conditions oflegality, are such that the very belief that one has
a prima facie obligation to go along with them makes one guilty 'by
association.
Ultimately the first source of obligation, participation in a joint
enterprise, fails to establish an obligation to obey, for such participation merely requires doing that which contributes to the success of the
enterprise. But Soper argues for an obligation to obey those whose
actions lead to the failure of the enterprise. Respect for them as joint
entrepreneurs requires frustrating them rather than obeying them. A
sense of a shared enterprise gives one license to act against one's partner's wishes where but for the partnership one would not be allowed to
interfere. If we go on an expedition together, I may be entitled to use
force to restrain you from some very damaging action which will lead
to the expedition's failure even though I may not use the same means
to save a stranger from failure in an enterprise of which I am not a
part. This explains why citizens care more than foreigners about evils
perpetrated by their own government even when they do not suffer
from them. It explains why citizens feel free to engage in civil disobedience whereas visiting foreigners do not. Respect arising out of the
existence of a joint enterprise may actually undermine any obligation
to obey an unjust government rather than support it.
Soper's second source of obligation, the need to spare the feelings
of the rulers, 19 is both too strong and too weak to serve as a foundation of an obligation to obey the law. It is too weak because it applies
19. In a footnote Soper explains: "I have cast the theory in terms of respect for 'those in
charge' only because that is the limiting case of law; in most cases, those who accept the system
and thus deserve respect will include citizens as well as officials." P. 179 n.36. Naturally the
argument has to hold in the limiting case if it is to be valid at all. That is why Soper concentrates
on the limiting case, and why I commented on it in those terms. Paradoxically Soper fails to
notice that the conditions which he rightly regards as normal, i.e., in which sections of the population share the attitude of those in charge, do not strengthen his argument at all. The respect for
the rulers, he claims, is based on the fact that they are the rulers, that they do their best to carry
out a necessary job. By-standers may share the values and attitude of the rulers. But being bystanders they do not deserve that respect. (It is arguable that voters, or at least those who actually vote, are themselves among the rulers. J. Austin, for example, held that the British sovereign
is not Parliament but those who have a right to elect it. I am not arguing who should count as a
ruler. My only concern is with the claim that similar respect is owed to members of the public
who share the attitude of the rulers toward the law.) They do, of course, deserve the respect that
is due to all humanity. But then it does not matter that they are citizens of one's own country.
On that argument the population of Poland ought to obey the laws of Poland in order not to hurt
the feelings of Chemenko, or those of the commander-in-chief of the Soviet army. Most of the
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only to law-breaking acts the commission of which will be or is likely
to become known to the officials. Right now, sitting by myself in the
study late at night, I can think of some dozen offences I can commit
within the next half hour of which no one will know if I choose not to
let my secret out. Besides, the vast majority of violations of law are
infringements of private rights. The overwhelming majority of these
will never reach official notice, and were always known to be most
unlikely to do so.
In any event, Soper's argument applies only if the rulers mind if
their laws are not obeyed. I do indeed hope that they do mind. I
myself, and almost everyone I know, mind if valuable laws are recklessly disregarded or deliberately flouted. If Soper does not count the
need to spare my feelings as a ground for an obligation to obey the law
this is presumably because I am not involved in the legal system in the
way which will make my feelings count. But if so it is reasonable to
assume that one should give special consideration only to those feelings of the rulers which result from the fact that they make and enforce the law, the feelings which are not shared by ordinary citizens.
(One would not feel obliged, for example, to spare the rulers' feelings
in private matters entirely unconnected with their official functions
just because their official functions obligate us to spare their feelings.)
One should, in other words, avoid engendering feelings of unappreciated or frustrated authorship (which distinguishes the rulers from
the rest of us). One may well doubt, however, whether such feelings
are widespread among the rulers. Many of them are just doing a job.
They care about success or failure. But one would have to be very
presumptuous to assume that one's petty violations would make a difference to their feelings, or that they are likely to make such a
difference.
Another thought is relevant here. Do we really want to encourage
the sort of feelings that Soper's argument presupposes? It is true that
we do not like "the unthinking invocation of ritual and rote" (p. 153).
But for myself I would replace it with a dedication to the task coupled
with a sense of moral responsibility, and would shy away from the
personal involvement which leads to continuous frustrations when
others fail to do as one wishes. This last attitude on which Soper models his political theory is both undesirable and, luckily, rarer than he
thinks.
Soper's argument is too strong because it does not apply to the law
alone. Much governmental business nowadays is carried out not by
the use of public law powers but through the conduct of economic
policies. Those have little to do with the achievement of minimum
security for people. Nor do most laws have much to do with that task.
points I make in the text against the argument from respect to the rulers apply to any arguments
based on respect to those who share their views as well.
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If it is better to have law, however imperfect, than to have no law at
all, then it is also better to have government, even with imperfect policies, than to have no government at all. So if there is prima facie
obligation to obey the law, there is also a prima facie obligation to
follow government policy recommendations. If the President advises
all employees to forgo any wage demands in the coming year, then
there is a prima facie obligation to do so. There can be little doubt
that in a case like this he will be frustrated and upset if people do not
take his advice. I venture to regard this as a reductio ad absurdum of
Soper's argument.
CONCLUSION

There is much in the book that I did not mention. In particular I
did not comment on the excellence of many of Soper's critical discussions. His discussion of the frequent abuse of considerations of certainty (pp. 102-07), for example, should be taken to heart by all the
positivists and realists who all too often rely on the need for certainty
in a most unthinking manner. While focusing on the book's novel
ideas I could not do full justice to its value in stimulating discussion
and re-examination of old ideas. I failed to discuss Soper's use of paradigms and his revival of the provocative paradigm of parental relations
as a model of political authority. There is much in the book to delight
as well as to infuriate. This reader's ultimate conclusion is, however,
that Soper has failed to make good his aspiration to provide us with a
cogent new theory of law and political obligation. 20

20. I am grateful to Kent Greenawalt for letting me see his co=ents on chapter three, to be
published in the proceedings of the March 1984 Hart conference in Jerusalem.

SOURCES OF LAW, LEGAL CHANGE, AND AMBIGUITY. By Alan Watson. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 1984. Pp. xviii,

164. $22.50.

Sources ofLaw, Legal Change, and Ambiguity, by Alan Watson, 1 is
a valuable and ambitious discussion of the "sources of law" - how
law is developed and what authority gives it legitimacy. The first half
of the book discusses methods of lawmaking at various points in European history, while the second concerns problems of lawmaking in
modern England and makes proposals for radical reform. Both halves
share a single thesis: that inadequate and uncertain sources of law in
Western society have often caused confusion as to what the law is.
Unfortunately, Professor Watson's treatment, spanning twentytwo centuries in 131 pages of text, is too brief and too cursory to do
justice either to the subject or to the author's own provocative ideas.
The result is two incongruous halves uneasily pasted together rather
than a seamless whole. Furthermore, the second half- especially the
author's proposal for a new system of law - is especially vulnerable to
criticism.
The "sources of law" of which Watson writes include custom, legislation, scholarly writing, and judicial precedent. 2 The general line of
his argument is clear: these sources of law are often inadequate and
unclear, and lawyers and others have paid insufficient attention to improving them. One of his examples of this inadequacy is the legislative
system of England (and, by analogy, that of the United States), in
which old, outmoded laws are retained because the legislature does not
have the will to agree on new laws (p. 83). A related example is the
legislative habit of passing statutes with broad, often ambiguous language (because it is easier to secure a majority this way), and leaving it
to the courts to divine the legislative "intent" behind the language even though there really was no such -"intent," and many of the legislators voting for a bill may not even have read it (pp. 78, 80). Consequently, there is much confusion as to what the law is and from whom
it comes.
In arguing that this problem is by no means new, Watson draws on
examples from ancient Rome, from Germany and northern France in
the thirteenth through fifteenth centuries, and from Italy, France, and
1. Professor of Law and Classical Studies, University of Pennsylvania, and editor of a forthcoming English edition of Justinian's Digest.
2. Unfortunately, the author is not always entirely clear what he means by such terms. For
example, "custom" as he uses the phrase is extremely difficult to define. It is something other
than merely prevailing moral values (p. xii), but it does appear to have something to do with
popular feelings and usages, pp. 22, 37- which need not, however, be current usages but may be
relics of past beliefs. P. 27.
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Scotland in the seventeenth century. In all of these examples,
problems resulted when a jurisdiction sought to formulate its laws,
especially when the jurisdiction sought to use custom (whether its own
or another's) or the laws of another jurisdiction.
In imperial Rome, Watson notes, confusion about the sources of
law was partly caused by the fact that works which had the force of
law were rarely collected and difficult to find, so that even lawyers did
not have access to them (pp. 16-17). In medieval Germany and northern France, law was almost wholly customary and local. Custom,
however, is often hard to discern and leaves many gaps, creating a
legal vacuum, which in Germany was filled in part by Spiegels (books
discussing the legal customs of a specific place). These books were
privately produced, yet often considered authoritative even outside of
the place covered - oddly, since the laws treated by the books were
based solely on the custom of the jurisdiction covered (pp. 26, 28). The
failure of custom to provide sufficient legal guidance in a jurisdiction
thus led it to adopt the customs of other jurisdictions. Furthermore,
in time the Spiegels came to be treated as a kind of code, which would
override custom itself (p. 38) -thus making one jurisdiction's custom
subservient to that of another area.
Another way in which the legal vacuum was filled was the practice
of some towns of carrying over intact the body of law of another town
(even when that other town was not politically dominant). The body
of law adopted would itself be essentially the custom of the "mother"
town; the "daughter" town would not only adopt this custom but rely
on interpretations of the law by experts in the "mother" town. Adding to the confusion was the fact that the mother town's law was
often unwritten - indeed, such law was in many cases written down
for the first time by the experts, or Schoffen, only in response to questions from the "daughter" town as to what the latter's own law was
(pp. 35, 39). The value of custom as a source of law is that it reflects
and is adaptable to local usage and belief, yet in the case of both the
Spiegels and the "mother-daughter" arrangements, jurisdictions
adopted the custom of other areas, partly because their own customs
were inadequate in that they were not known or written down.
In medieval France, there were frequent attempts to remedy the
inadequacies of custom by writing them down. Once these customs
were written out, however, they tended to become established as if
they were statutes, thereby lessening the values of adaptability and
compatibility with local usage (pp. 44, 48, 101). Even though the customs were written down, there remained a need for other sources of
law, yet these alternative sources were sometimes ludicrously disguised. One French legal compiler, in clarifying the French law, simply carried over the old Roman law but, to give it authority, attributed
it to French sources (p. 47).
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In seventeenth-century Italy, lack of sufficient local law contributed to the use of Roman law and of the "law of neighboring places,"
a group often broadly defined to include France and Spain. Use of
Roman law, however, led to confusion because the Latin of the Roman legal authorities was neither that of the classical authors nor that
of educated seventeenth-century ltalians. 3 The "law of neighboring
places," meanwhile, was extremely difficult to find and raised further
language problems. Moreover, since there was no systematic ranking
of other legal systems, its use gave great discretion to the judge to use
whatever law he favored.
Watson perceives a common problem in these examples: the inadequacies of existing law create a vacuum which leads to the often unthinking adoption of other inadequate law in an attempt to fill the
gaps. Examples include the ready adoption of the Spiegels and of
"mother" towns' laws in medieval Germany, the significance accorded
Lord Stair's Institutions in eighteenth-century Scotland (p. 74), and a
frequent demand for codification as a way to clarify and simplify the
law. The replacements, however, were themselves rarely satisfactory:
Watson notes, for example, that "codification once complete, law begins to sink back into complexity and ambiguity" (p. 97).
Watson's overview of the problem of legal sources in European
history is an impressive performance, but a flawed one. For some periods, notably seventeenth-century Italy, he relies too heavily on the
work of a few authors, and sometimes strains to make rather bland
quotations carry a greater freight of significance than they can easily
bear.4 For some areas, such as ancient Rome, it may be that there are
just not enough sources extant for an exhaustive study; the author's
twenty-four pages on the subject span eight centuries. If this is the
case, however, it would be better to face up to it rather than to pretend
that one can accurately discern, from a handful of texts, a society's
attitudes toward many issues over a long period. Finally, Watson does
not always translate his quotations into graceful (or even grammatical)
English. One quotation is rendered as: "we relied upon God who in
the magnitude of his goodness can gift and bring to fulfillment
achievements deeply desperate" (p. 94).
It is, however, the second half of the book - dealing with modem
England and with Watson's scheme for a new system of law- that is
most vulnerable to attack. First, while a paucity of materials may justify briefer treatment of ancient Rome than is desirable, the same cannot be said of nineteenth-century England. Yet the author, having an
3. Indeed, one polemicist argued for the use of Italian in the law on the ground that, being
clearer and better understood than Latin, its use would give rise to less litigation. P. 57.
4. See, e.g., pp. 4 (in which a two-sentence joke by Cicero becomes a major source on Romans' attitude toward legal authority), 60 (in which a single contemporary treatise becomes virtually the sole important authority Watson uses in discussing seventeenth-century Italy).
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opportunity to delve into the riches of English legal history, and expressly disclaiming a desire to deal with the present (p. 77), prefers to
write, in pamphlet-like tones, about Harold Wilson's Minister of
Housing and Local Government, and how impossible it is to get anything through parliament nowadays.
Watson's scheme for a new system of law is still less satisfactory.
He proposes a system of "two-tier law" which he believes would enhance the law's comprehensibility, comprehensiveness, and responsiveness to community values and social change (p. 112). Under this
system, the focus would be on the legislature rather than on the judiciary. An interpretive committee, mainly of legal experts, would draft,
and the legislature ratify, two types of law: a code of "first-tier law,"
which would be accessible to the layman and would seek to make the
law clear to nonlawyers; and a "second-tier law," which would be a
thorough, comprehensive commentary on the first-tier law, and which
itself would have the force of statute but, unlike modem statutes,
would deal in much greater depth with the reasoning behind the law
and with possible applications to hypothetical situations. In Watson's
system, the courts would be limited to applying the very detailed codification and would have no judicial precedent and no direct citation of
scholarship (p. 113).
Professor Watson somewhat uncharitably observes that his proposal has no chance of being enacted because of the selfishness and
self-interest of the legal profession (p. 131). Another possible reason is
that it is an inherently unworkable scheme. It may seem quaint to
hand over the writing of laws to a group of legal scholars who would
sit down and write up works with the force of law. This, however, is
in itself not a very difficult notion to accept, since it is essentially how
the Uniform Commercial Code, for example, originated. The problem, rather, lies in Watson's belief that such law could be drafted so as
to be considerably more comprehensible than it is now, and so that it
could significantly reduce the role of judges in producing the law.
The first-tier law, for example, would be aimed specifically at nonlawyers (p. 126), but it would be supplemented by the second-tier law
and overridden by it when the second-tier law is directly on point. 5
Therefore, even if the first-tier law is extremely clear, it could mislead
the citizen who does not know the second-tier law. Indeed, the
clearer, simpler, and shorter the first-tier law is, the greater its likely
divergence from the more complex and specific second-tier law. Conversely, the more accurate the first-tier law is, the less likely it is that it
could be communicated effectively to the nonlawyer. It may be that in
a complex society, law is necessarily complex, and it is an unhappy
thing to imagine trying to explain amorphous standards such as "rea5. Presumably the extremely difficult issue (not dealt with by Watson) of whether the secondtier law is "on point" would be decided by the judges.
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sonableness" to the layperson in such a way that it will both be understood by the nonlawyer and be accurate enough to be codified law.
But there are still graver practical obstacles to the plan. Watson
himself acknowledges that it is extremely difficult to pass any law in a
legislature, and still more difficult to get legislators to agree on a common reason for passing it. Legislators, therefore, are often intentionally obscure in their drafting, so as to attract the largest number of
other legislators to support the bill for often contradictory reasons,
and, by eliminating unneeded specificity, to avoid antagonizing voters.
Difficult as it is to pass laws under that system, it would be far more
difficult to persuade a majority of legislators to agree on a thorough
treatise having the force of law, discussing in detail how the law will
apply to specific situations, and describing the reasons why the law
should be so.
This problem is compounded by the fact that the Interpretive
Committee itself would probably have enormous trouble agreeing, and
a treatise approved by the committee on a three-to-two vote would be
unlikely to find much deference in the legislature. The Committee
might be able to agree (or to win legislative ratification) only by obscuring the language and blurring differences; the temptation to leave
the real problems to the judges would remain. 6
Thus, even if the author's proposal were put into effect, it would be
likely to lead naturally to a system with many of the defects of our
own: broad, general statutory language, promulgated because more
specific proposals were too controversial, and supplemented by a
plethora of exceptions. Therefore, while Professor Watson may be correct in arguing that the currently existing sources of law are unsatisfactory, he has failed to show that his own preferred alternative would
be an improvement.

6. Any expectation that the statutes passed would be free of inconsistencies should be tempered by knowledge of the Ameriqan Law Institute's experiences in drafting restatements. Faced
with a dispute between Williston and Corbin on whether consideration should be required for an
enforceable contract, the Restaters of Contracts chose simply to include both views, in sections
75 and 90. See G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CoNTRACT 60-65 (1974).
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By Terry

Nardin. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 1983. Pp. xii,

350. Cloth, $35; paper $14.50.
This unusual book is at once an attempt to revise and refine the
nineteenth-century conception of international relations and an argument for its moral superiority to some prominent recent theories of the
international system. Professor Nardin, an associate professor of
political science at the State University of New York in Buffalo, claims
that the statements of shared purposes in the United Nations Charter
and in the programs of movements like the New International Economic Order misstate the basis for international association and
misapprehend the nature of moral conduct in international affairs.
Professor Nardin's argument falls short in several respects and his
tone is occasionally a bit strident, but this spirited defense of a controversial position should stimulate discussion among theorists of international law and jurisprudence.
Nardin begins by positing a distinction between "purposive" and
"practical" associations of states. Purposive associations exist to further shared goals or ends: the abolitionist movement in America was
an example of a purposive association of individuals dedicated to ending slavery. Practical associations, on the other hand, are based on
rules or practices that are "proper to be observed in acting, regardless
of one's end" (p. 8). One example of a practical association might be a
debating society, in which the members may not share any political
goals but are willing to follow common rules of debate.
Nardin argues that international society is emphatically the latter
kind of association, a practical association of states based on a few
shared rules and practices. It is "an association of independent and
diverse political communities, each devoted to its own ends and its
own conception of the good, often related to one another by nothing
more than the fragile ties of a common tradition of diplomacy" (p. 19).
He rejects the idea that states associate with other states in order to
further goals of world peace or economic justice, arguing that such a
notion is logically incomplete, historically inaccurate, and morally
questionable.
Nardin's argument from logic is not very satisfying. For Nardin,
the purposive conception of international society is logically incomplete because its proponents "forget that any international agreement
presupposes commonly acknowledged rules and procedures according
to which agreements can be made" (p. 24). 1 The idea here is that no
1. This classic formalist argument appears in different guises again and again in the book.

See, e.g., p. 172 ("Pacta sunt servanda is a rule of customary international law and not itself the
product of explicit agreement, for if it were one would have to ask why the agreement to respect
agreements should itself be respected."); p. 194 ("The view that there is no law apart from what
officials decide is indeed self-contradictory, for the very idea of an official presupposes rules ac-
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association can be purely purposive: some kind of practical association, some set of rules independent of the common goals and accepted
by all, must lie behind a purposive association if it is to act at all. Even
an anarchists' convention needs procedural laws, or else no one can
say when the group has agreed. Yet this does not prove that international society is not purposive -just that it must be practical as well.
Nardin's developed theory of the practical association of states must
go beyond this weak formalism.
Professor Nardin's historical and political argument is stronger:
the "practical" conception of international society can better account
for the actual diversity of ends in the world and can generally provide
a more satisfactory explanation of international law. His analysis of
the history of international relations is perhaps the most interesting
and valuable section in the book. Nardin combines intellectual and
social history by exploring the tension between practical and purposive
conceptions of international law both in the theories of Kant and Bentham and in the actual workings of nineteenth-century and twentiethcentury international organizations. His treatment of the Concert of
Europe (pp. 86-97) is particularly good. Historians have viewed the
Concert as both an instrument of collective interests and as a set of
practices designed to achieve security and stability among nineteenthcentury European states regardless of their individual goals. The early
congresses of the Concert can be seen as purposive efforts to advance
the shared goal of monarchical rule, but they were also practical efforts to preserve the European states system by promoting legitimate
monarchy in inost - but not all 2 - countries. Nardin suggests that
the Concert maintained an essentially practical character even late in
its history, when theories of world community and shared goals were
on the rise. He states that, "although it was colored by successive versions of the view that it existed to promote the shared purposes of its
members, it never entirely shed its character as a forum for setting
limits to the conduct of sovereign powers whose national pride, preoccupation with security, and competitive rivalry stood as evidence of
their divergent purposes" (p. 96). This descriptive passage seems close
to Nardin's idea of what an important international organization
should be.
Nardin's treatment of the League of Nations and the United Nations is more problematic, and his rather surprising conclusion that
the United Nations represents a more radical departure from traditional forms of international relations than does the League relies too
much on a very formal reading of the United Nations Charter.
cording to which public offices are created, their lawful incumbents identified, and the scope of
their jurisdiction delimited.").
2. Nardin notes that the rights of nonmonarchical states like the Swiss Republic were pro·
tected as well. See p. 89.
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Nardin writes that the United Nations "is really an attempt to establish a new regime in which states, associated on the basis of an agreement to pursue together certain specified substantive ends, will follow
the directives of the body that is set up to organize the pursuit of these
ends" (p. 107). Nardin may be right that such an attempt was made;
five Secretaries-General would agree that it did not succeed.
The heart of Nardin's book is his attempt to show that the practical conception of international society is compatible with traditional
theories of international law. First, Nardin seeks to establish that international law is law, arguing that legislation, enforcement, and a
common judge are only contingent features of law and that their apparent absence in the international system does not negate the existence or obligatory nature of international law. Yet Nardin's
treatment of the problem of enforcement is disturbingly casual:
First, we must dispose of what is now generally agreed to be the most
egregious error made by Austin concerning the relation between enforcement and law. . . . That one agent is able by force to compel another to
act in a certain manner can hardly mean the first has right to demand
such conduct, nor can it mean that the second has a duty or obligation to
comply. . . . Coercion alone cannot create rights or obligations of any
sort, legal or nonlegal. On the contrary, enforcement presupposes the
validity of the law that is enforced. 3

This is unpersuasive. It is not quite so clear that Austin was wrong
that law must carry sanctions to be law, and Nardin's argument does
not inspire confidence. Austin could reply that any sense of obligation
to obey the law other than fear of sanction is a contingent feature of
law, and that coercion does oblige a person to obey if she wishes to
avoid the sanction. That is, law need not be morally binding to be
considered "law." In any case, Nardin's argument that enforcement is
not a sufficient condition for law - "Coercion alone cannot create
rights" (p. 126) - does not prove that enforcement is not a necessary
component.
Nardin next attempts to delimit the specific character of the internationallegal system. He argues that international law is largely customary law, created not intentionally but rather as "the indirect
consequence of innumerable and substantively motivated acts, decisions, and policies" (pp. 166-67). Empirical investigation and inductive reasoning are needed to determine whether a particular norm is a
valid international law: there is no "rule of recognition," in H.L.A.
Hart's terms. According to Nardin, "Customary international law
arises wherever there exists a general or uniform practice together
with the general acceptance of this practice as law" (p. 167).
There are two related problems with this conception of international law. First, Nardin does not explain how international legal
3. Pp. 125-26 (emphasis in original).
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rules change.4 Second, Nardin's model will not be very helpful to
someone who wants to predict whether particular acts of one country
are likely to be accompanied by strong sanctions, weak sanctions, or
no sanctions at all from the international community. The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia was followed not by superpower confrontation, but by the first stirrings of detente. The Soviet invasion of
Mghanistan had very different consequences, and Nardin's model cannot explain why.s
Nardin ends his book with an argument for the moral superiority
of the practical conception of international society. The fact that the
rules and practices of international law are limited in number and
scope allows the world's societies to remain diverse and encourages
self-determination. Yet surely other values are lost. A system of international law premised on the formal equality of states that aims only
to place a few restrictions on international conduct will do little to
overcome the dire poverty of the developing countries and little to
equalize the real power of nations. Perhaps it is unrealistic to suggest
that the countries of the world can engage in a purposive association
to bring about these changes, but Nardin comes uncomfortably close
to justifying the status quo.

AMERICA'S UNWRITIEN CONSTITUTION: SCIENCE, RELIGION, AND
POLITICAL ~PONSIBILITY. By Don K. Price. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press. 1983. Pp. xvi, 202. $19.95.
Don K. Price1 has arrived at a time of life when he could be forgiven for indulging an impluse to recapitulate or even simply to reprint
previously published views, perhaps prefacing such a work with a brief
essay highlighting the continuing relevance of any relatively dated theories and placing the various pieces in proper historical context. In
4. Nardin writes:
The rules of customary international law are a distillation of the constantly changing practices of states, and they reflect the collective will of the international community only in the
sense that certain patterns of conduct from time to time attain a degree of acceptance sufficient for them to be acknowledged as a distinct practice entitled to govern future conduct.
P. 167. Nardin completely fails to explain how the changing practices of states attain this degree
of acceptance or why accepted practices fall into disrepute.
5. Both the problem of change and the likelihood of sanctions in the area of international
relations are treated with sophistication by Professor Myres S. McDougal and his colleagues at
the Yale Law School. See generally M. McDOUGAL, STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER
(1960); Reisman, International Lawmaking: A Process of Communication (1981) (April 24,
1981) (unpublished Harold D. Lasswell Memorial Lecture).

1. Emeritus professor of government and of public management, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University.
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this volume,Z Price has done both more and less than this. On the one
hand, he has reappraised virtually all of the major issues encountered
in a long career of service to government, private foundations, and
universities, and has forged them into a thoughtful analysis of American political policymaking. On the other hand, he has done all this in
a single concise and readable volume that bespeaks a greater concern
with reaching and influencing a contemporary audience than with preserving the form of past publications.
The conciseness of his work is suitable in that Price's main concern
is the "roots of the incoherence of policy which lead[s] many critics to
wish to amend the U.S. Constitution" (p. 9). 3 The "incoherence of
policy" itself Price generally takes to be self-evident; the nature of the
perceived problem must be inferred from the proposed solutions.4 The
focus of the book is rather the underlying intellectual and social structures which determine whether our governmental institutions are capable of formulating coherent, unified policies. Price asks: "[H]ow
can we know what we should do and how we should do it and how we
may hold government responsible? That is to say, what is the authoritative source of truth on which we should rely" (p. 4)? These questions
raise broad and inherently amorphous issues, which it would be only
too easy to talk around at great length without achieving useful insight
or reform. Accordingly, Price dispenses with an extensive analytic
and bibliographic apparatus, saying, "The issues here are too broad to
be dealt with by the precise methods of the scientific study of politics
and society, but the stakes are high enough to discourage professional
timidity" (p. 14). To strike at the roots of incoherence, in other words,
one must at times run the risk of appearing opinionated and
conclusory.
In Price's case, any such appearance would be somewhat deceptive, for the groundwork for these opinions and conclusions has in fact
been laid by his previously published works, spanning more than four
decades. The thesis, for example, that America's "unwritten constitution" - "the fixed political customs that have developed without formal Constitutional amendment, but that have been authorized by
statute or frozen, at least temporarily, in tradition" (p. 9) - ought to
be the focus of reform, derives significant support from Price's early
work. In the late 1930's, Price coauthored a series of studies on the
efficacy of the "city manager" form of government in selected cities.
2. This book has also been reviewed by Genuth, Book Review, BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC
SCIENTISTS, Mar. 1984, at 43.

3. An extreme manifestation of this tendency is the ongoing effort to call a constitutional
convention in order to pass a balanced budget amendment. See The Constitution as Cudgel, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 6, 1982, at 22, col. 1.
4. Price's proposals presume that a coherent policy is not simply one that leads to costeffective or nonduplicative programs. It also sets forth clear and specific goals with which voters
can agree or disagree so that the act of voting is as meaningful as possible.
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The city manager was seen at the time "as America's most promising
illustration of the need to separate management cleanly from policy
interests in the interest of economy and efficiency" (p. 172). Yet, detailed empirical study at times turned up cases such as that of Jackson,
Michigan: "The theory of the city manager plan has never been generally understood in Jackson. . . . Old political habits continued unchanged from one form of government to the other, making it
impossible under either for the electorate to exercise much control
over the policies of the administration." 5
Price was already well-educated to perceive the importance of "old
political habits" by study (begun as a Rhodes Scholar in the early
1930's) of the United Kingdom's unwritten parliamentary constitution. 6 The central lesson derived from these early studies is that new
written rules alone will never change "old political habits," and that
the key to political reform is "to command a consensus between the
major political parties . . . [that] would amount to an agreement on
how the unwritten constitution of the United States should operate"
(p. 128).
These and other earlier studies are incorporated by reference in the
instant work, primarily by the device of prefacing each chapter's footnotes with "reminiscences of the personal experiences which were responsible . . . for the opinions and prejudices that show through any
scholarly work" (p. 153). The result is two books bound in one cover
-the first a scholarly discourse, the second, in essence, Price's (abbreviated) memoirs. The use of this device reveals not only the sort of
authority ultimately relied upon in this book, but, in a sense, the sort
of authority Price suggests ought ultimately to be relied upon by government itself. Thus, a central conclusion of the book is that decisions
on "[t]he more important issues that arise at the higher levels of the
governmental hierarchy . . . ought to be controlled in the end not by
scientific data or predetermined rules but by moral and political judgment, guided in tum by a concern for the general welfare" (p. 143).
Readers may perhaps be satisfied by less rigorous documentation
when their author's "moral and political judgment" seems sound. It is
less clear that citizens in a democracy should be encouraged to defer in
a comparable way to government officials by entrusting a select cadre
of them with the "substance of policy" (p. 80). By analogy to the
British civil service, however, Price proposes just such an institution:'
"a career service heading the major departments of a government,
with lifetime commitments and a common outlook or education and at
S. H. STONE, D. PRICE & K. STONE, CrrY MANAGER GOVERNMENT IN JACKSON (MICHl·
GAN) 48 (Pub. Admin. Serv. No. SP.13, 1939).
6. See Price, The Parliamentary System, 3 PuB. Ao. REv. 317 (1943).
7. An especially formative experience with regard to this proposal was Price's service on
former President Hoover's Commission on the Organization of the Executive Branch.
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least partly beyond political control" (p. 76). By "common education," he means that these civil servants would be "generalists" as opposed to legal and scientific experts. 8 Price's suggestions for creating
this establishment within government include decreasing the number
and type of congressional checks on agencies and programs, creating
cabinet committees with genuine authority to formulate policy away
from the media spotlight, decreasing the numbers of political appointees, and reducing staff size in Congress and.the Executive Office of the
President.
In Price's view, giving the executive more freedom to act is the best
way to make government more accountable to the people. His new
version of the unwritten constitution would call for a disciplined Congress, in which party leaders are able to deliver or withhold support
and maintain a firm party line, to delegate to the president enough
authority to carry out and coordinate the laws. A streamlined executive office, in turn, sets the overall goals of policy and delegates authority, through the cabinet, to a cadre of depoliticized professionals who
independently work out and execute the government's programs. Accountability is assured both by the more direct causal link between
voters and government action and by the more coherent manner in
which the business of government is carried out: "In ideal terms, this
is the more democratic and responsible arrangement since it focuses
the attention of the electorate and Congress as a whole on the main
general issues, which they are interested in and competent to decide,
rather than on technical or procedural details, which they are not" (p.
141).

Thus, Price's direct answers to the difficult question he poses are
quite striking. The "authoritative source of truth on which we should
rely" in setting national policy is not religion (the written Constitution
prevents this), not science (which the unwritten constitution has relegated to a role similar to that of religion), and not law (which is not a
source of truth at all, but at best a codification of truths arrived at by
other means). It may be objected that the "moral and political judgment" Price posits instead as the ultimate policymaking guide is not
an "authoritative source of truth" either, but rather a name for the
kind of comprehensive and disinterested review of goals and anticipated effects that ideally takes place before any government program is
implemented. Nonetheless, Price argues that it is a failure to defer to
expertise in this mode of analysis which has fostered, in recent years, a
"partly scientistic and partly legalistic" (p. 93) approach to lawmaking
that precludes coherent and responsible government.
8. Nonetheless, it would probably not be unreasonable to envision this elite corps as people
very much like Price's students at the Kennedy School of Government. In terms of existing
governmental structures, the recently instituted Senior Executive Service is positioned to become
such a corps, but would have to be expanded and modified significantly to meet Price's criteria.
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Attempts to legislate scientific goals directly, without tempering
the scientists' "abstract and specialized view of the truth" (p. 58) with
a measured sense of priorities, results in programs that are liable to be
partially or wholly counterproductive.9 At the same time, the legalistic tendency to curb abuse of power through extensive congressional
oversight of agencies and programs splinters democratic responsibility
in the legislature and removes accountability from the president and
the departments.
The American voters' manifest preference for the genial generalist
Ronald Reagan over both the scrupulous scientist Jimmy Carter and
Washington lawyer Walter Mondale illustrates the timeliness, if not
necessarily the accuracy, of Price's critique. The voters' acceptance of
a president who seems to rely upon his own moral and political judgment in preference to detailed technical knowledge in his decisionmaking does not, however, indicate a willingness to permit an unelected
bureaucracy similarly to set its own policy. On the contrary, at present there appears to be a durable consensus against the creation of a
new and powerful entrenched establishment within the federal government. Price confronts this objection directly, acknowledging the existence of a deep-seated American "prejudice against establishments"
and loathing for bureaucracy (p. 77). He goes even further, and sets
up an analogy between our theological past, with its antiestablishment
bias, and our scientific present, typified by a deep attachment to academic freedom. In this scheme, absolute, unyielding truths may motivate political action so long as religious and scientific institutions are
not part of the government, nor so closely allied with government as to
dictate results inconsistent with democracy and justice. Having ratified
this American prejudice insofar as it extends to established religion
and science, 10 Price maintains that we should not carry our prejudice
against establishments to the extreme of banishing policy-making expertise from government. Rather, we should see to it that there is an
institution firmly implanted in the government which can preserve coherence, fairness, and continuity in the execution of the laws.
Once a viable solution is paired in the public's mind with a pressing need, a consensus that changes the unwritten constitution may
well arise with surprising speed. While it may be easier to command a
consensus upon some of Price's proposals than others, they are all
worthy of consideration, and their presentation serves to make them
appear neither more nor less significant than they actually are.
9. The original and detailed form of this argument may be found in D. PRICE, GOVERNMENT AND SCIENCE: THEIR DYNAMIC RELATION IN AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (1954); D.
PRICE, THE SCIENTIFIC EsTATE (1965).
10. An example of established science is the Soviet Academy of Sciences, which, Price observes, "in its complete dependence on government authority and support and its dedication to a
quasi-scientific ideology that justifies absolute authority, is rather like the old Russian Orthodox
church in its relation to the czars." Pp. 11-12.
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As a final point, it is perhaps also significant that Price's thought is
characterized by a pervasive, unpolarized dualism: Though fond of
thinking in two's, Price never thinks in opposites. As a youth, he was
driven to inquire into the necessity of having two Methodist Episcopal
churches in one small Virginia town, and was gratified to be told,
"Why, of course, we have to have one church for the Republican
Methodists and one for the Democrat Methodists" (p. 154). In a field
whose broadest conceivable distinction seems to be that often elusive
contrast between Republican and Democrat, this fascination with contemplating the profound differences between two things that are very
much alike - mayors and city managers, British and American government, personal prejudice and scholarly predilection - is surely a
valuable trait. Imagine his intellectual thrill when his Oxford tutor
told him: "You American students never seem to understand. . . .
Merton College has no rule against climbing into the college after midnight. It has a very strict rule against getting caught climbing into the
college after midnight" (p. 159).

THE DILEMMAS OF INDIVIDUALISM: STATUS, LIBERTY, AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. By Michael J. Phillips. Westport,

Conn.: Greenwood Press. 1983. Pp. x, 226. $29.95.
Sometime in the near future, the individual in the United States
will become subject to increasingly harsh and repressive denials of
freedom- or so says Michael J. Phillips 1 in The Dilemmas ofIndividualism: Status, Liberty, and American Constitutional Law (p. 200).
Ironically, the principal reason for the transformation of America into
an authoritarian regime will be liberalism, through its emphasis on
individual freedom (pp. 165-66):
It would be inaccurate to identify the "liberalism" to which Phillips refers with any particular political group. Instead, Phillips' liberalism "is a body of ideas dominating the entire American political
spectrum" (p. vii). The central goal of liberalism as Phillips describes
it is the emancipation of individuals from all restraints on their ability
to act (pp. 153-56). To achieve this end, liberal freedom must accomplish two things. First, it must remove physical and cultural obstacles
to individual freedom of choice. Second, it must confer upon individuals the capacity to exercise the options available to them. According
to Phillips, the logical conclusion of this sort of liberty is either random or suicidal behavior (pp. 156-58).
1. Michael J. Phillips is an Associate Professor of Business Law at Indiana University's
School of Business. He holds a J.D. degree from Columbia University, and LL.M. and S.J.D.
degrees from the National Law Center at George Washington University.
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Thus, liberal freedom must always be tempered with restraining
influences (p. 161). Phillips contends that the communitarian influences of family, region, religion, morality, and the like no longer provide any meaningful limitation on the self-destructive aspects of
liberalism, because their continued vitality depends upon prejudicial
treatment of certain groups. For example, Phillips asserts that discrimination against women and children "[i]s vital to, if not constitutive of,
the family and the stabilizing and socializing functions it fulfill[s],"
with "the opprobrium visitd [sic] upon homosexuals and illegitimates"
also contributing (p. 164). Similarly, he states that black slavery and
the banishment of American Indians to reservations were elements "of
a social hierarchy that, if nothing else, was ordered" (p. 164). Finally,
the disabilities imposed upon all of these groups "also tended to reinforce the values of localism and community by putting some restraints
on social and geographical mobility" (p. 164). In sum, Phillips sees
prejudice as "reflecting and to some degree forming, a variegated pattern of social ordering" (p. 163). Since liberalism, through the equal
protection clause of the Constitution, prohibits discrimination, it has
destroyed the ability of communitarianism to guide society. 2
In the absence of communitarian values liberalism must seek restraints elsewhere. Phillips interprets the growth of government, corporations, labor unions, and other large organizations as the response
to that need (pp. 167-72). 3 These institutions fail to provide a viable
substitute for the lost community (pp. 164-74), so American society
will instead avoid the self-destructive tendencies of liberalism through
increasing institutional oppression of individuals (pp. 94-96), which
will ultimately take the form of direct control of thought by use of
drugs, behavior modification, and "electrical and chemical stimulation
of the brain" (pp. 200-07).
Confronted with a vision as radical and apocalyptic as this, the
reader expects Phillips to propose a "coherent system of alternative
moral possibilities," but Phillips disappoints this expectation "because
[he has] no such scheme to offer." Instead, he explicitly adopts a "descriptive posture" (p. ix), asserting that there is no escape from the
script he has recited (pp. 199-200). Phillips palliates his projection by
claiming that "it is fairly optimistic" because the alternatives, nuclear
war, economic ruin, or environmental disintegration, are even worse
(p. 207). 4
Although some of Phillips' reasoning invites dispute - for exam2. Note that Phillips neither acknowledges that the equal protection clause bars only arbiand irrational discrimination, see, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663,
681 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting), nor considers the possibility that this limitation on the reach
of equal protection doctrine might provide the necessary restraint.
3. Phillips contends that individuals have essentially identical relationships with all large
institutions, and that it is therefore unnecessary to distinguish among them. See pp. 69-120.
4. See also p. 196 ("subordination to Russian designs").
trary
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pie, he ignores alternative explanations for the phenomena he observes, such as the impact of technology on the growth of modem
institutions5 - his rhetorical method forces the reader to question his
motives. Throughout his book, Phillips relentlessly distances himself
from the text, using at least four tricks. First, he couches his argument in opaque, confusing jargon.6 Second, he continually uses weak
phrasing in order to express his positions in an equivocal manner. 7
Third, he attributes many of his statements to unspecified third parties. 8 Finally, he argues via proxy, presenting the writings of great philosophers (most frequently Hegel, 9 Hobbes, 10 and Plato 11) in lieu of
his own. By riding on the coattails of these formidable thinkers, Phillips lends his writing a false aura of legitimacy12 and avoids responsibility for his arguments.
5. P. 167 (institutions have grown in order to provide their members with "competitive advantages and increased power," to facilitate the "urge toward the domination and exploitation of
nature," and to fulfill "the need for some alternative form of community"). Phillips' argument is
fundamentally incomplete, see notes 20-22 infra and accompanying text, so there is little to be
gained by responding to its substantive shortcomings.
6. The most important examples are provided by his use of the terms "freedom" and "status." According to Phillips, there are three varieties of freedom: "negative freedom," pp. 3-4;
"authoritarian positive freedom," pp. 9-12; and "liberal positive freedom," p. 13; and two types
of status, "ascribed" and "achieved." P. 8. His work largely depends on the manipulation of
these five terms. One example of Phillips' use of jargon is as follows: "In one version of this
status-positive freedom fusion, ascribed statuses are very significant." P. 10 (footnote omitted).
Phillips burdens other concepts with unnecessarily weighty labels, see, e.g., p. 202 ("corporate
state paradigm"), and forces his reader to digest complex terminology even where a more common word would be unambiguous. See, e.g., p. 206 ("ESB and neuropsychopharmacology" instead of "drugs").
7. See, e.g., p. 6 (supporting a point by claiming that it "is not self-evidently false"); p. 30
("[t]oo often, it appears"); p. 72 ("tend to support"); p. 98 ("may come to involve").
8. See, e.g., p. 89 ("some contend"); p. 96 ("often said").
9. See, e.g., pp. 168-69.
10. See, e.g., pp. 184-85.
11. See, e.g., pp. 189-93. These three are the only writers Phillips discusses at any length, but
he lists other prominent figures when it serves his purpose. See, e.g., p. 5 ("Saint Paul, the Stoics,

Kant").
12. Phillips' disregard of philosophical writings contrary to his position undermines the ability of his citations to legitimate his work. For example, Phillips uses the theories of Thomas
Hobbes to justify his assertion that liberalism leads to totalitarian government. After certifying
Hobbes' liberal credentials (and Hobbes, along with John Locke, is acknowledged as one of the
two originators of the liberal tradition), Phillips paraphrases Hobbes' conclusion that " '[t]he
absolute power of the sovereign . . . was really the necessary complement to . . . individualism.'" P. 184 (quoting G. SABINE, A HISTORY OF PoLmCAL THEORY 475 (1961)).
Phillips neglects, however, to respond to the works of Locke. Like Hobbes, Locke presumes
that humanity consists of free individuals. J. LoCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 309
(1960). The individualism of Locke, contrary to that of Hobbes and Phillips, does not require
state repression. In fact, Locke explicitly denounces authoritarian forms of government: "Freedom from Absolute, Arbitrary Power, is so necessary to, and closely joyned with a Man's Preservation, that he cannot part with it, but by what forfeits his Preservation and Life together." J.
LocKE, supra, at 325 (emphasis in original). American political theory draws largely on the
philosophy of Locke, not Hobbes. Since ·one of Locke's primary purposes was to debunk Hobbes' authoritarian theory, A. GUTMANN, LIBERAL EQUALITY 19-20, 27-32 (1980), Phillips cannot make effective use of Hobbes without also responding to Locke.
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Phillips bases much of his book on the ground broken by the Conference on Critical Legal Studies, but perverts its teachings in the process. Like Phillips, the Critical Legal scholars point out the
bankruptcy of unqualified liberalism as a means of social organization
and the fundamental contradiction between liberal individualism and
communitarian values. 13 Phillips parts with them, however, when he
asserts that a society must choose either freedom or community (pp.
198-99) and attacks reduced discrimination brought about by enforcement of the equal protection clause. 14
To this end, Phillips allots much of his work to describing and
denouncing the law of equal protection (pp. 19-67, 151-64). For example, he opposes due process in juvenile criminal proceedings, student
rights, and equal access to contraception and abortion for minors (p.
27). He believes that government should control the development of
children (p. 30), and that discriminatory treatment is necessary to ensure that children mature in the manner prescribed by the state (p.
25). He makes similar arguments as to women (pp. 20-24) and
blacks. 15
Phillips devotes substantial effort to deprecating affirmative action
(pp. 121-52, 174-78), even though he acknowledges that this criticism
provides little support for his thesis (p. 175). He never mentions the
term "affirmative action," but uses the pejorative expression "reverse
discrimination" instead. 16 He bases his blanket condemnation 17 on
13. Compare, e.g., p. 175 (liberal individualism is self-contradictory), with Kennedy, The
Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 BUFFALO L. REv. 209, 211 (1979) ("Most participants in American legal culture believe that the goal of individual freedom is at the same time
dependent on and incompatible with the communal coercive action that is necessary to achieve

it.").
14. In contrast, members of Critical Legal Studies emphatically believe that society can in·
corporate a commitment to both individual freedom and communitarian values. See, e.g.,
Horowitz, The History of the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1423, 1427-28
(1982) (law must incorporate both individualism and communitarianism); Kennedy, supra note
13, at 217 (individual liberty and state coercion can be fused in civil society); Tushnet, Following
the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REv.
781, 785-86 (1983) (liberalism is an incomplete social theory, but 'just as conservatism correctly
emphasizes our mutual dependence, liberalism correctly emphasizes our individuality and the
threats we pose to each other. It may be that we live in a world of tension, in which no unified
social theory but only a dialogue between liberalism and conservatism is possible."). In fact, one
purpose of their criticism is to engineer a better synthesis of these ideals. See, e.g., Kennedy,
For.m and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1685, 1710 (1976) ("What
we need is a way to relate the values intrinsic to form to the values we try to achieve through
form.") (emphasis in original); Kennedy, supra note 13, at 221. But see Gabel & Kennedy, Roll
Over Beethoven, 36 STAN. L. REv. 1, IS (1984).
Professor Alan David Freeman addresses the points Phillips raises more specifically. He
insists that the law can integrate equality and justice and criticizes the law for its failure to do so.
See Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical
Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REv. 1049, 1103, 1119 (1978).
15. See text following note 16 infra.
16. See, e.g., p. 174.
17. Phillips criticizes every area of affirmative action law: education, pp. 134-35, 138-41; em·
ployment, pp. 135-38; and voting, pp. 142-45.

February 1985]

Moral, Political and Legal Philosophy

767

the belief that, occasionally laudable purposes 18 notwithstanding, affirmative action constitutes "odious" discrimination (p. 176) and is
merely a "concession to minority political power" created in response
to a "thoroughly egoistic group struggle" (p. 178). 19 Phillips also contends that commitment to affirmative action will cause the government
to take increasingly severe measures to ensure equality, culminating in
"genetic engineering" (p. 177). Ultimately, Phillips hopes for a catastrophe engendering an "authoritarian" backlash that abolishes affirmative action (p. 177).
In essence, Phillips argues that liberalism run amok will compel
American society to choose among a few intolerable alternatives: suicide, incoherence, or tyranny involving government-sponsored drug
addiction and eugenics. Moreover, he claims that the triumph of liberalism depends upon rejection of communitarian values, which is in
turn caused by enforcement of the equal protection clause. A reader
accepting this reasoning is likely to decide that rejecting equal protection might restore communitarianism and avert the occurrence of
Phillips' frightening predictions. Phillips supports this conclusion by
advocating that contemporary society should impose sacrifices on minorities and stating his regret that America's representative democracy presents obstacles to such a program (p. 197). In this light
Phillips' actual purpose, which is quite different from his stated descriptive intent, becomes clear: The Dilemmas of Individualism is a
manifesto for the repudiation of the equal protection clause that goes
beyond rejecting affirmative action, and actually advocates restoring
the most reprehensible varieties of public and private discrimination.
Phillips does not even renounce the view that slavery is the social condition for which blacks are most suited, condemning that institution
only for its excesses (p. 31).
Unfortunately, Phillips lacks the audacity to state his thesis boldly
and defend it forthrightly. 20 In adopting his indirect argumentative
style, Phillips avoids the most important questions. First, he never
considers the possibility that liberty and community might be harmonized. 21 Second, even if the two cannot coexist, Phillips does not at18. Phillips concedes that preferential treatment may sometimes be justifiable to remedy past
injustice and to develop true equality of opportunity. Pp. 132-34.
19. Even if affirmative action is necessary to implement the desired enhancement of the productive capabilities of minority group members, Phillips argues, liberalism will probably destroy
the "nurturing" and "constructive" aspects of the doctrine. P. 178.
20. Phillips' caution in this respect also explains his efforts to dissociate himself from his
writing. See text at notes 6-12 supra.
21. If the law can resolve the conflict between individual and community and avoid the disastrous consequences of that conflict, as Critical Legal Studies teaches, then there is no need to
eviscerate the equal protection clause. The Critical Legal scholars predicate their argument on
the discord between individualistic and communitarian goals, but, directly contrary to Phillips,
argue for legal militancy on behalf of distributive justice. See, e.g., Freeman, supra note 13;
Feinman, Critical Approaches to Contract Law, 30 UCLA L. REv. 829, 849-57 (1983) (critical
theory seeks to expose, destroy, and replace contract law because it encourages wealthy parties to
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tempt to prove that constitutionally mandated equality is the root of
the conflict. 22 Phillips does himself and his reader a disservice by his
failure to address these pivotal issues, for this shortcoming makes his
startling views neither convincing nor credible, and relegates his book
to the status of an extremist novelty.

PASSION: AN EsSAY ON PERSONALITY. By Roberto Mangabeira Unger. New York: The Free Press. 1984. Pp. ix, 300. $14.95.

Western philosophical thought has moved from the metaphysical
to the nihilistic, and in Passion Roberto Unger wants to reconcile the
two. Unger notes that "[t]wo great themes" comprise the focus of
metaphysical "thought about personality": the central value of interpersonal relationships, especially love, and the continuous assault on
particular societies, to express the belief that human beings are inherently unable to find perfect satisfaction on earth (p. 24). The first
theme has not disappeared from human experience, claims Unger, for
it is only through relationships with other free and "insatiable beings
like ourselves" that we are able to find fulfillment (p. 25). But the
second theme eliminates the possibility of discovering meaning in the
real world, by positing instead an extra-human, ideal realm. Radical
modernism, embracing the nihilistic, rescues the metaphysical tradition from viewing human existence as merely an earthly metaphor of
an absent ideal, but just as it recognizes that we are what we make
ourselves to be, radical modernism concludes wearily that "the individual can expect no real progress" (p. 36) from such a continuous
reshaping of the self. The possibility of discovering meaning on earth
disappears altogether in this extreme skepticism.
Roberto Unger, who teaches law and social theory at Harvard
University, believes that a form of social life can be developed which
will better enable us to become fully human, which to him means a
society where institutions are structured primarily to promote personal freedom and change, and in Passion he points toward this goal in
the realm of interpersonal relations. In an earlier article, The Critical
exert power over poorer parties); Frug, The Ideology ofBureaucracy in American Law, 97 HARV.
L. REv. 1276, 1295-96 (1984) ("Bureaucracy is ... a primary target for those who seek liberation from modem forms of human domination. . • . Critical theory seeks to undermine" its
existing legal basis and foster individual liberty.); Klare, Contracts Jurisprudence and the FirstYear Casebook, 54 N.Y.U. L. REv. 876, 896-98 (1979) (law cannot succeed unless it takes steps
to reduce the influence of advantaged parties in "our highly stratified, class-dominated society");
Mensch, Freedom of Contract as Ideology, 33 STAN. L. REv. 753, 771-72 (1981) (contract law
cannot accommodate true freedom without rejecting the premises of present law).
22. Phillips' approach logically requires this result, but he does not explicitly propose rejecting the ideal of equality.
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Legal Studies Movement, 1 Unger described this goal in the field of
legal systems; in a reported forthcoming work, he will do so in social
theory. Unger recognizes that the "systematic shift in the character of
direct personal relations" 2 which he discusses in Passion "need[s] to be
thought out in legal categories and protected by legal rights," 3 a task
he began undertaking in The Critical Legal Studies Movement. "[N]ot
to give these reconstructed forms of solidarity and subjectivity institutional support would be . . . merely to abandon them to entrenched
forms of human connection at war with our ideals."4 Likewise, an
"indispensable counterpart to a psychology of empowerment" (p. 75),
which Unger describes as enabling people to discover novel ways of
relating with others (p. 73), "is a social theory capable of describing
the forms of social life that advance the practical, passionate, and cognitive forms of empowerment" (p. 75), which Unger undoubtedly will
elaborate in his forthcoming social theory. But the discussions oflegal
systems and social theory are in a sense secondary, for they depend
upon a notion of what it means to be a human being, a notion which is
expounded in Passion.
Although he accepts the modernist conception that people are defined by their" social and historical contexts, Unger's view of what it
means to be a human being cuts across specific social and historical
barriers and consists of a universal claim: all human beings - no
matter when or where they live - must cope with the tension between
our need for and our fear of one another, which Unger calls "the problem of solidarity" (p. 4). "Passion" is "the living out" of this tension
(p. 115), which, though unresolvable, is eased to varying degrees by
the many different passions (p. 125). Much of the book involves descriptions of these passions, detailing their relative successes and failures in alleviating the conflict between our need for and fear of each
other.
In Unger's hierarchy of passions, it is love which best allows us to
embrace others without apprehension:
Love is an impulse toward acceptance of the other person, less in his
distinctive physical and moral traits (which the lover may criticize and
devalue) than in his whole individuality. The specific features of the person are never irrelevant - how else could you know him? - but they
are taken as incarnations of a self that both speaks through them and
transcends them. This acceptance, made in the face of the inexorably
hidden and threatening being of another person, always has something of
the miraculous. It is an act of grace devoid of condescension or resentment. [P. 221.)5
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REv. 561 (1983).
/d. at 598.

/d.
/d.
Both Freud and Hegel appear to have influenced Unger's discussion of love:
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For Unger, when we love, we break down defenses, vulnerabilities,
socially circumscribed barriers to appreciating other people. As we
ourselves learn to play with the possibilities of being human, as we
discover a multiplicity of ways of reinventing and recombining the elements that make up our otherwise unchanging character, we begin to
see that other people are like us because they can do the same.
Although we cannot reach an extra-human Utopia, we can find images
of that ideal realm in our own lives by recognizing and uncovering the
infinite possibilities that human freedom can provide. Thus, in Unger's view, the form of social life which would best enable us to become fully human is that form which is most malleable, which we see
as itself contingent. This form leaves us the greatest room for play:
An order must be invented that, considered from one standpoint, minimizes the obstacles to our experiments in problem-solving and in accepted vulnerability and, viewed from another perspective, multiplies the
instruments and opportunities for its own revision. Such an order represents the next best thing to the unconditional context whose unavailability helps make us what we are. Its characterological form is a central
concern of this inquiry . . . . [P. 193.]6

A crude but helpful description of Unger's best society would understand it as procedural rather than substantive. That is, the best
society is one in which we can most easily open ourselves to others
with the least amount of fear - this society is best because of how it
enables us to act, not what it enables us to be. 7 Unger is careful,
though, in both Passion and The Critical Legal Studies Movement, to
disassociate his theory from theories of abrupt and violent revolution,
which are only necessary to shatter the harsh intransigence of a society
which fails to allow for change. Unger's best society would contain
Normally, there is nothing of which we are more certain than the feeling of our self, of our
own ego. This ego appears to us as something autonomous and unitary, marked off distinctly from everything else. • • . [T]owards the outside . • • the ego seems to maintain
clear and sharp lines of demarcation. There is only one state • . • in which it does not do
this. At the height of being in love the boundary between ego and object threatens to melt
away. Against all the evidence of his senses, a man who is in love declares that 'I' and 'you'
are one, and is prepared to behave as if it were a fact.
S. FREUD, CIVILIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 12-13 (J. Strachey ed. 1961) (footnotes omitted). See also G. HEGEL, PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT~ 184, at 112 (A. Miller trans. 1977)
(emphasis in original):
[Self-consciousness] is aware that it at once is, and is not, another consciousness, and equally
that this other is for itself only when it supersedes itself as being for itself, and is for itself
only in the being-for-self of the other••.. They recognize themselves as mutually recogniz·
ing one another.
6. The legal aspect of this possible order is described in The Critical Legal Studies Movement
as "deviationist doctrine." Unger, supra note 2, at 576-83. This "enlarged doctrine"
is the legal-theoretical concomitant to a social theory [and a theory of interpersonal relations] that sees transformative possibilities built into the very mechanisms of social stabilization and that refuses to explain the established forms of society, or the sequence of these
forms in history, as primarily reflecting practical or psychological imperatives.
Id. at 583.
7. Cf J. CoNRAD, LoRD JIM 212-15 (Stein discussing "how to be").
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self-corrective mechanisms because its inhabitants would see it as a
laboratory for possibilities of human interaction, and be ready to laugh
at rather than defend a failed program.
That Unger's best society would be a place of playfulness and
laughter is, however, only implicit in Passion, and Unger's failure to
describe the mirthfulness of the world of love exemplifies the speculative tone that marks the central failure of the work as a whole. For
although Unger claims that his mode of discourse will be that of the
storyteller (p. 84), his stories are more generic than specific. He discusses, abstractly, lust, despair, hatred, vanity, jealousy, envy, faith,
hope, and love, without once posing a hypothetical tale to situate the
discussion in the lives of real or imagined people. 8 Only once, when he
embarks upon a "biographical genealogy of the passions" (p. 147),
does Unger move toward a specific example. His lovely discussion of
the development of the passionate self9 reminds one substantively of
Piaget's description of the development of the child, 10 but even here
Unger is rarely able to tell real tales. II
Unger also tends to think dualistically; the cornerstone of Passion
is itself a dichotomy, that of our mutual longing for and fear of each
other. But Unger would probably acknowledge that his method of
thought is not meant to imply an ontological assertion. Unger recognizes that although we often discuss our relations by reducing them to
easily graspable conceptual categories, our relations themselves are
complex and not dualistic.
The publication of Passion seems to mark an important moment in
post-modernist thought. Although human is all we can be, we nonetheless yearn for more, and the post-modernist task is to find representations of the infinite in the real. The most fertile ground for such
representations is humanity itself. We cannot reach godliness, but as
Roberto Unger's Passion so trenchantly demonstrates, we can reach
each other, if only we can learn to overcome who we are and envision
the possibilities of who we might become.

8. For examples of helpful story-telling in philosophical discourse, see J. SARTRE, BEING
NOTHINGNESS 40-42, 96-98, 101-03 (H. Barnes trans. 1956). For further elaboration of this
feature of Unger's work, see Teachout, Book Review, 83 MICH. L. REv. 849, 883-90 (1985) (in
this issue).
9. For example, when Unger describes a child's "beginning of reflection upon contingencythe discovery that things might be otherwise," p. 154, he first writes of a child's crying for his
parents. Then Unger widens his interpretive focus to incorporate in the crying the child's developing though still unconscious sense of his mortality: "If only he could think more clearly, he
would not stop crying when father comes home." P. 154.
10. See generally THE EssENTIAL PIAGET (H. Gruber & J. Voneche eds. 1977).
11. Unger's description of the turniiig points in the development of the passionate self is
general rather than specific. That is, Unger rarely sets forth a hypothetical situation to represent
a larger idea.
AND

